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ABSTRACT The current financial crisis has its origins in global asset
scarcity, which led to large capital ﬂows toward the United States and to the
creation of asset bubbles that eventually burst. In its ﬁrst phase the crash exac-
erbated the shortage of assets in the world economy, which triggered a partial
re-creation of the bubble in commodities markets, and oil markets in particu-
lar. This bubble in turn led to an increase in petrodollars seeking ﬁnancial
assets in the United States, which became a source of stability for the U.S.
external balance. The second phase of the crisis is more conventional and
began to emerge in the summer of 2008, when it became apparent that the ﬁnan-
cial crisis would permeate the real economy and sharply slow global growth.
This slowdown worked to reverse the tight commodity market conditions
required for a bubble to develop, ultimately destroying the commodity bubble.
I
n this paper we argue that the persistent global imbalances of recent
decades, the subprime crisis, and the volatile oil and asset prices that fol-
lowed it are tightly interconnected. All stem from a global environment
where sound and liquid ﬁnancial assets are in scarce supply.
Our story goes as follows: Global asset scarcity led to large capital ﬂows
toward the United States and to the creation of asset bubbles that even-
tually burst. The crash in the real estate market was particularly complex
from the point of view of asset shortages, since it compromised the whole
financial sector and, by so doing, closed many of the alternative saving
vehicles. Thus, in its first phase, the crisis exacerbated the shortage of
assets in the world economy, which triggered a partial re-creation of the
11472-01_Caballero_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  12:16 PM  Page 1bubble in commodities, and in oil markets in particular. Rising oil prices in
turn led to an increase in petrodollars seeking ﬁnancial assets in the United
States. In contrast to the typical, destabilizing role played by capital out-
ﬂows during ﬁnancial crises, petrodollar ﬂows became a stabilizing factor
for the U.S. economy. The second phase of the crisis is more conventional
and began to emerge during the summer of 2008. It became apparent then
that the ﬁnancial crisis would permeate the real economy and sharply slow
global growth. This slowdown worked to reverse the tight commodity
market conditions required for a bubble to develop, ultimately destroying
the commodity bubble.
We now develop some of these steps, starting from the underlying
structural force fueling U.S. asset appreciation. Figure 1 displays the main
patterns of global imbalances since 1990 as revealed in the current accounts
of the United States, Europe and Japan (combined), emerging Asia, and
the oil-producing economies, all relative to world GDP. The facts are well
known: Starting in 1991 the U.S. current account deﬁcit worsened contin-
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authors’ calculations.
a. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and 
Switzerland.
b. Bahrain, Canada, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Mexico, Norway, Oman, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela.
c. China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand.
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Figure 1. Current Account Balances, 1990–2008
11472-01_Caballero_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  12:16 PM  Page 2uously, reaching 6.4 percent of U.S. GDP in the fourth quarter of 2005, then
falling back to 5 percent of GDP by early 2008. The current account sur-
pluses that were the counterpart of the U.S. deficits initially emerged in
Japan and Europe and were bolstered by surpluses in emerging Asia and
the commodity-producing countries after 1997.
In a previous paper we showed how this buildup in global imbalances
could be understood as the consequence of asymmetries in ﬁnancial devel-
opment and growth prospects across different regions of the world.
1 In
particular, we argued that the emerging market crises at the end of the 1990s,
the subsequent rapid growth of China and other East Asian economies, and
the associated rise in commodity prices in recent years reoriented capital
ﬂows from emerging markets toward the United States. In effect, emerging
markets and commodity producers in need of sound and liquid ﬁnancial
instruments to store their newfound wealth turned to the U.S. financial
markets, which were perceived as uniquely positioned to provide these
instruments.
2
As we explained then, a by-product of this reallocation of capital ﬂows
was a necessary decline in U.S. and world real interest rates and a boom in
U.S. asset markets. Ex ante real interest rates on 10-year U.S. government
bonds fell below 2 percent a year in 2002 (figure 2), and the rate on a
30-year ﬁxed-rate conventional mortgage reached 5.23 percent in June 2003
(ﬁgure 3), with annual inﬂation at 2.9 percent. As foretold by Ben Bernanke,
then a governor of the Federal Reserve, in his inﬂuential “savings glut”
speech,
3 it is now apparent that this boom was located in no small part in a
rise in U.S. housing markets and the related markets for structured credit
instruments (ﬁgures 4 and 5). In the context of low real interest rates, U.S.
households were encouraged to take on more housing risk than they could
bear, risks that then disappeared as if by magic from the mortgage-backed
securities and other structured investment vehicles whose supply exploded
over the same period (ﬁgure 5). The catastrophic and systemic failures of
this originate-to-distribute model are now well documented.
4
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1. Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008).
2. In recent years a signiﬁcant portion of the capital ﬂows from emerging markets to the
United States took the form of ofﬁcial reserve accumulation. The composition of capital
flows is not the focus of our analysis. Nonetheless, we observe that especially in the case
of China, most of these reserves are indirectly held by local investors through low-return
sterilization bonds.
3. Bernanke (2005).
4. See Brunnermeier (2009) and Greenlaw and others (2008) for detailed recent accounts
of the subprime crisis.
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Figure 2. Real Interest Rates, 1990–2008
By sometime in 2006, the rise in U.S. real estate prices had come to a
halt, and the U.S. current account deﬁcit began to turn around (see ﬁgures 1
and 4). Starting in earnest in June 2007, with the bailout of two hedge funds
operated by the investment bank Bear Stearns that could not meet their
margin calls, the world economy entered, with a certain fracas, into a period
of signiﬁcant global adjustment. Within weeks, funding dried up for entire
segments of both the U.S. and the international banking sectors, especially
asset-backed commercial paper (see ﬁgure 5), leading to major convulsions
of credit and money markets, including the dramatic collapse and rescue
of several major U.S. and European commercial and investment banking
institutions. More than 12 months after the onset of the crisis, ﬁnancial
markets appear nowhere near stabilized. In fact, by the beginning of the
summer of 2008, ﬁnancial distress in major players had begun to accelerate,
a process that started with the government rescue of the government-
sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in July and culminated
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Source: Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.15, “Selected Interest Rates.”
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Figure 3. Contract Interest Rate on 30-Year Fixed-Rate Conventional Home Mortgage
Commitments, 1990–2008
Sources: Standard & Poor’s; International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics; authors’ 
calculations.
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Figure 4. Real S&P/Case-Shiller Composite 10 Home Price Index, 1990–2008
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This was a watershed moment. Until then, the crisis had been severe but
largely contained within the financial sector. Following the collapse 
of Fannie and Freddie and of the entire U.S. broker-dealer industry, the
seizing up of wholesale money markets reached unprecedented propor-
tions. Figure 6 decomposes the spread between the three-month London
interbank offer rate (LIBOR) and the three-month Treasury yield (the TED
spread) into two parts: a LIBOR-overnight index swap (OIS) spread, which
measures interbank credit risk, and a Treasury-OIS spread, which captures
the flight to liquidity. In the weeks following the collapse of Lehman
Brothers, both components of the spread increased dramatically, with
the Treasury-OIS spread reaching 165 basis points on September 17 and
the LIBOR-OIS spread reaching 365 basis points on October 10. With
credit markets on life support, the crisis quickly spread to the rest of the
economy.
It is most likely that the strong U.S. capital inﬂows of the last few years
contributed to the signiﬁcant weakening of U.S. credit markets. The even-
tual recognition of their degraded performance was one of the triggers of the
current crisis. However, this weakening is in itself part of the endogenous
6 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
Source: Federal Reserve Board.
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Figure 5. Commercial Paper Outstanding, 2003–08
11472-01_Caballero_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  12:16 PM  Page 6response of U.S. ﬁnancial markets to world ﬁnancial conditions. In effect,
U.S. assets became stretched as U.S. markets tried to accommodate the
world’s excess demand for assets. Therein lies the structural problem. This
chronic excess demand for assets derives from ﬁnancial underdevelopment
in emerging markets and most commodity-producing economies, rather
than from macroeconomic imbalances. Excess asset demand leaves an
unmistakable signature in low real interest rates, which in turn provide 
a fertile ground for bubbles to emerge. Thus an alternative, if perhaps
metaphorical, interpretation of the sequence of events is that the bubble
located in emerging markets during the 1990s migrated to the U.S.
housing and credit markets (and before that the NASDAQ) following
the emerging market crisis of the late 1990s and the coming on line of
capitalist China.
5
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5. See Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006) for a model of bubbles and capital ﬂows in
emerging markets based on ﬁnancial underdevelopment.
Source: MorganMarkets; authors’ calculations.
















Figure 6. Components of the TED Spread, January 2007–November 2008
11472-01_Caballero_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  12:16 PM  Page 7With the U.S. financial crisis, that bubble collapsed as well. Initially,
the excess asset demand that produced it did not. Indeed, emerging markets
and commodity producers found themselves more than ever in search of
investment opportunities—witness the long list of sovereign wealth funds
that have recently been formed in many emerging markets and the enormous
financial means at their disposal. According to Deutsche Bank,
6 these
state-owned funds managed $3 trillion in assets as of September 2007 and
were expected to be managing an additional $7 trillion within 10 years.
(These figures are now being revised downward as a result of the brutal
slowdown in world economic growth.) Another bubble was likely to appear
as the endogenous response of a world economy seeking to increase the
global supply of financial assets. We argue that it did so quickly, in the
form of a commodity bubble. Figure 7 tracks the real price of a barrel of
West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil since 1970, in 2008 dollars.
Between June 2007 and June 2008, the real price of WTI increased by
almost 100 percent. During the summer of 2008, however, as the ﬁnancial
8 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
6. Deutsche Bank (2007).
Sources: Global Financial Data; International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics; authors’ 
calculations.
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Figure 7. Price of West Texas Intermediate Oil, 1970–2008
11472-01_Caballero_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  12:16 PM  Page 8crisis spread and economic growth started to decline, commodity prices
suffered a dramatic collapse. Between July 2008 and October 2008, the
real WTI price declined by almost 53 percent, bringing it back to its level
of June 2007.
7
Essentially, in the first phase of the crisis the combination of tight
commodities markets and the decline in equilibrium real interest rates
made it worthwhile, from the point of view of private economic agents, to
transform commodities into an asset (or even a new bubble). The mecha-
nism is related (but not identical) to that described by Harold Hotelling
more than 70 years ago:
8 Sufﬁciently low real interest rates make inventory
accumulation proﬁtable and drive up the price of exhaustible resources.
However, in the second phase the market tightness precondition disappeared,
which in turn destroyed the asset accumulation incentive behind the feverish
rise in commodity prices, triggering their collapse.
A scatterplot of daily observations of WTI prices against the S&P500
index from 2004 to 2008 (ﬁgure 8) clearly illustrates the different phases
of the crisis. Before June 2007 the correlation between oil prices and U.S.
stock prices was positive. During the ﬁrst phase of the crisis, from July
2007 to June 2008, the correlation turned strongly negative. Finally, since
July 2008, the correlation has again become strongly positive. The negative
correlation during the ﬁrst phase of the crisis is especially interesting from
our point of view. Explanations of the surge in commodity prices driven
purely by demand for commodities would predict a positive correlation
between stock and commodity prices. Later in this paper we provide evi-
dence from instrumental variables estimations to support the claim that the
negative correlation in this phase is due not to oil supply shocks but to the
ﬁnancial mechanism we describe.
Let us now return to the implications of these developments for global
imbalances. According to the framework developed in our earlier paper,
the sharp contraction in U.S. asset supply caused by the subprime crisis
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7. This price pattern is quite general across commodities. It is apparent for energy com-
modities (coal, gasoline, heating oil) and for foodstuffs used as biofuels, such as corn. It is
also present for most metals (aluminum, copper, gold, and silver) with the exception of lead,
zinc, and nickel, whose prices peaked earlier in 2007. We ﬁnd it also for most food prices
(wheat, soybeans, coffee, tea, cocoa, barley, rice, palm oil, groundnuts, and rapeseed oil, less
so for sugar, cattle, and hogs). Our model provides a broad-brush picture of the general
evolution of commodity prices. Yet individual commodities might also be affected by other
factors—supply disruptions, weather, and commodity-speciﬁc demand shocks. We also note
that high energy prices generally push up food prices through higher production costs and
stronger competition for acreage from biofuels.
8. Hotelling (1931).
11472-01_Caballero_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  12:16 PM  Page 9should lower equilibrium interest rates and trigger a rebalancing away
from now-“toxic” U.S. assets.
9 The resulting decline in U.S. wealth reduces
domestic consumption and improves the trade balance and the current
account. This is in line with what has happened since June 2007: annual
U.S. long-term real interest rates fell from 2.3 percent to 1.4 percent by
June 2008 (ﬁgure 2). The current account deﬁcit improved from 5.6 percent
of GDP to 5.0 percent, and the trade deficit from 5.2 percent of GDP to
5.0 percent, from June 2007 to 2008.
Although our prediction is qualitatively correct, the initial response of
the trade balance and the current account was muted relative to what our
basic view implies. That is, if the relative financial appeal of the United
States is what is behind the initial imbalances, the subprime crisis should
have led to a sharper turnaround in the U.S. current account. Why didn’t it?
Again, we argue that the answer lies in the endogenous response of com-
modity prices. Because commodity inventories were initially very low, a
10 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
9. Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008). The model also predicts a simultaneous move
toward “safe” U.S. assets. This ﬂight to quality is an important feature of our analysis.
Sources: Global Financial Data; authors’ calculations.
a. July 1, 2007, to June 30, 2008.
b. July 1, 2008, to November 8, 2008.
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Figure 8. West Texas Intermediate Oil Price and S&P500 Index, 2004–08
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ing economies, net asset creation from the commodity mechanism was
initially small. In contrast, the strong impact of the price rise on the income
of commodity-producing economies led to a sharp rise in their demand for
stores of value, which further depressed real interest rates and stabilized
capital outﬂows to the United States in the short run.
10
In the current, second phase of the crisis, external imbalances may or
may not increase. Two offsetting forces are at play. On the one hand, the
decline in economic growth reduces asset supply. This increases capital
outﬂows to the United States. Simultaneously, the collapse in commodity
prices makes commodity producers poorer, hence reducing asset demand.
For low levels of inventories, we ﬁnd that this second effect dominates, so
that external imbalances fall.
The rest of this paper provides a model and a quantitative assessment of
the story and mechanisms just described. The model adds commodities to
our earlier framework. It has two regions, U and M. We interpret U as the
United States and M as the rest of the world, with an emphasis on emerg-
ing market economies and commodity producers. The model features two
goods: a nonstorable good X, produced by both regions, and a storable
commodity Z, produced by M only. The supply of X grows exogenously
whereas the supply of Z is constant. This feature is meant to capture the
growing demand pressures on commodities that arise from robust world
economic growth. We set up the model so that a bubble develops initially
in U. As discussed above, we interpret this bubble metaphorically as the
extent to which asset markets in U are stretched to provide ﬁnancial assets
to the rest of the world. With the bubble, the United States runs a larger
current account deﬁcit and world interest rates are low.
The original event in our model is the U.S. ﬁnancial crisis: The bubble
bursts at t = 0, leaving savers scrambling for alternative stores of value.
The resulting decline in real interest rates has two effects. First, it increases
the value of “good” U assets. This translates into a ﬂight to quality, from the
bubble assets to the “good” U asset. Second, and more important, it triggers
the commodity markets into action. As speculative hoarding takes place,
the prices of commodities jump, resulting in a wealth transfer from U to M.
But M needs good stores of value. Thus a significant portion of that
newfound wealth ﬁnds its way back into U. The resulting capital inﬂows
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10. The reader may wonder why the rise in the price of oil is not simply a transfer of
income from oil consumers to producers and hence has no impact on asset demand. The
answer is in our choice of numeraire, which is the noncommodity good. This will be clearer
once we describe the model but, as with all normalizations, it has no substantive implications.
11472-01_Caballero_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  12:16 PM  Page 11further boost the value of U assets and cushion the impact of the bubble’s
bursting. Eventually, and gradually, the increase in asset supply due to
growing commodity inventories pushes up interest rates, which forces
rebalancing in U. To capture the second phase of the crisis, we assume that
somewhere along this process the financial crisis compromises global
growth. The decline in global growth removes the excess demand in
asset markets, leading to a decumulation of inventories and a rapid col-
lapse in commodity prices along with asset prices.
Before turning to the details, it is worth clarifying two modeling subtleties
that are important in interpreting our formal discussion. First, although the
commodity side of our model shares some of Hotelling’s seminal insights,
our model does not rely on his key stock constraint (an exhaustible resource).
Instead, the model includes a ﬂow extraction constraint which is insufﬁ-
cient to meet demand growth. This mismatch is the main factor behind the
structural trend in commodity prices. In this context the subprime collapse
superimposes on the previous trend a speculative reason for rising com-
modity prices. The collapse in global growth in the second phase of the
crisis undermines the structural reason (the trend) supporting the bubble.
Second, this speculative factor raises the effective opportunity cost of
resource extraction for producers, since there is now an asset opportunity
cost, as in Hotelling’s model, which reduces their extraction incentives.
The latter response means that, in equilibrium, there need not be any rise in
measured inventories, and hence inventories throughout this paper are
deﬁned to include previously unextracted commodities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The ﬁrst section describes
the basic mechanism connecting the ﬁnancial crisis to commodity prices.
The second section focuses on long-run global imbalances, and the third
discusses short-run imbalances and presents some back-of-the-envelope
estimates of the effects we describe. The fourth section calibrates the model
and explores its dynamic implications. The ﬁfth section presents evidence
supporting the speculative nature of the rise in oil prices following the sub-
prime crisis and of the recent drop in these prices. The ﬁnal section offers
some conclusions. Appendices A and B expand the discussion in the
penultimate section to explore further the possible role of futures markets
and antispeculative policies, and of inventory trends, respectively. Appen-
dices C and D present formal derivations of some of the equations in the
second, third, and fourth sections.
11
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11. Appendices C and D may be found online via the Brookings Papers website
(www.brookings.edu/economics/bpea/bpea.aspx).
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We begin by describing the main features of our model for the world
economy.
The Model for the World Economy
In our model, time evolves continuously. Infinitesimal agents (house-
holds or traders) are born at a rate θ per unit of time and die at the same
rate; population mass is constant and equal to one. Agents receive some
endowment at birth, which, for simplicity, they save in its entirety until
they die. Denote by Wt the savings accumulated by households at date t. In
every period, aggregate consumption Ct is then a constant fraction θ of
these accumulated savings:
12
Households consume a basket of two goods: an X good (the numeraire)
and a Z good. Intratemporal preferences over these two goods are of the
constant-elasticity-of-substitution type:
Here σ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution, and α > 0 controls the equilibrium
share of expenditure on the Z good.
Given a relative price pt of the Z good, households split their consump-
tion between the two goods as follows:
The X good is a conventional nonstorable good, whereas the Z good is a
storable commodity. Denote by It ≥ 0 the outstanding inventories of the Z
good. Storing the commodity imposes an iceberg storage cost d ≥ 0 per
unit of time and good stored. Denote by rt the instantaneous interest rate
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12. As we show in our earlier paper (Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas 2008), this can be
interpreted equivalently as log-preferences over consumption streams.
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.
t > 0, where a dot above a variable indicates its
time derivative. This arbitrage equation is central to the analysis of storable
commodities, as in Hotelling’s analysis. It states that the rate of capital gains
on commodities cannot exceed the interest rate, net of any convenience
yield or carrying cost.
The endowment of the X good, denoted Xt, grows at rate g > 0 over time.
By contrast, we assume that the endowment of the Z  good is constant
through time (Zt = Z); this assumption allows us to capture the idea that
demand pressures on commodities are growing over time.
13
The Z good is assumed to be noncapitalizable unless it is transformed
into inventories (below or above the ground). In contrast, a fraction δ of the
X good is capitalizable. We capture this feature as follows. At every point
in time, there is a number Xt of identical trees with an aggregate market
value of Vt. Each tree yields one unit of X good per unit of time, a fraction δ
of which is distributed to its current owners. Since the number of trees
grows at rate g, the total value of new trees is gVt per unit of time. The frac-
tion of the output that is not capitalized is distributed to newborns, as are
the new trees. Hence, the total endowment received by newborns per unit
of time comprises (1 −δ )Xt units of the X good, Z units of the Z good, and
gXt new trees. The value of this endowment is (1 −δ )Xt + ptZ + gVt.
The return on existing trees is the dividend-price ratio δXt/Vt plus the
capital gain V
.
t/Vt − g, which, in equilibrium, must equal the instantaneous
interest rate in the economy rt:
In addition to the tree asset, some of our equilibria will exhibit rational
bubbles, Bt, which must satisfy the arbitrage condition
where λ > 0 is the hazard that the bubble will burst in the next instant.
For simplicity we analyze the limit case as λ goes to zero and d > λ. These
assumptions allow us to approximate the solution with the perfect-foresight
case and to reduce the number of subcases we need to discuss.
() ( ) 6 t tt B rB  =+ , λ
() 5 rV X V gV tt t t t =+ − . δ 
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13. Note that our model differs from Hotelling’s in that we replace his stock constraint
with a ﬂow constraint on commodity production. This has important implications later, since
it allows us to separate more cleanly the asset aspect of commodities from their goods
aspect. Moreover, in our framework macroeconomic conditions determine whether one
aspect or the other dominates in price determination. See Jovanovic (2007) for a Hotelling-
based model of bubbles in exhaustible resources.
11472-01_Caballero_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  12:16 PM  Page 14Savings decrease with withdrawals (deaths) and increase with the endow-
ment allocated to new generations and the return on accumulated savings:
In equilibrium, savings must be equal to the value of all the assets in the
economy:
Using equation 3 and imposing market clearing in the market for X goods,
we obtain
In equilibrium, replacing equation 9 back into equation 7 yields the equi-




where εd is an expression that plays no role in our main discussion.14
The interest rate rises as θ rises, because a higher θ increases consump-
tion and reduces asset demand. The two terms in parentheses in the numer-
ator are central to our discussion below. The ﬁrst of these terms represents
asset supply: the interest rate rises with δ and with Bt + ptIt because they
increase asset supply. The second term represents the “petrodollar” effect
and is present when inventories are being accumulated: when the price of
commodities rises, the income of commodity producers rises more than the
effective income of commodity consumers falls. This net income effect
lowers interest rates because it raises asset demand.
Later on we will show that for plausible parameter values, the asset
demand effect dominates the asset supply effect in the short run, so that an
increase in the price of commodities puts downward pressure on real interest
rates. Since commodity prices also rise when interest rates fall (see expres-
sion 4), the interaction between commodity prices and real interest rates
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14. εd ≡− d(σ−1)α pt
1−σ/(1 +α  σ pt
1−σ).
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Although in practice the short-run elasticity of demand for the Z good is
signiﬁcantly smaller than one, it is useful to start with the case σ=1, since
it allows us to characterize explicitly the main mechanisms at work. We
simplify things further by studying the case where d converges to zero
(while preserving the assumption d > λ).
Assume momentarily that the equilibrium has neither inventories nor
bubbles. Then equation 10 yields a reference interest rate, r
ref =θ δ /(1 +α ).
Henceforth we shall assume that financial assets are sufficiently scarce
(δ is low) for the economy to be dynamically inefficient (r
ref < g):
Assumption 1: The economy is dynamically inefﬁcient: δ < g(1 +α )/θ.
BUBBLELESS EQUILIBRIUM. Suppose for now that there are no bubbles;
then the equilibrium must have inventories. To see this, note that if there are
no inventories, r = r
ref < g. But in this case equation 9 requires pt =αXt/Z,
so the price of commodities grows at a rate g, which exceeds the equilibrium
interest rate. Thus, there is a clear incentive to accumulate inventories,
which contradicts the no-inventories premise.
From expression 4 and equation 9, the dynamics of the economy can be
summarized in a simple system with variables It and qt ≡ pt/Xt:
where rt is given by
Asymptotically, the level of inventories stabilizes at a strictly positive
level, which is proportional to the degree of dynamic inefficiency in the
economy:
The price pt of the Z good grows at rate g, and the interest rate rt converges
to the growth rate g of the X good.
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11472-01_Caballero_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  12:16 PM  Page 16Figure 9 depicts the phase diagram associated with the dynamic sys-
tem 11. The system exhibits the saddle path property.
15 This saddle path
is downward sloping: when inventories are low (It < I
–
), the price of com-
modities is high (qt > q – ≡α /Z) and decreasing (rt < g). Conversely, when
inventories are abundant (It > I
–
), the price of commodities is low (qt < q –)
and increasing (rt > g).
A key element of our model lies in the slope of this saddle path. To under-
stand why it is downward sloping, consider an initial inventory position
I0 < I
–
and suppose that the price is such that the commodity market is ini-
tially in equilibrium at that inventory level (I
.
0 = 0, or q0 = q –). This is point B1
in ﬁgure 9. It is immediately apparent that the interest rate r0 that clears the
asset markets at point B1 must be below the growth rate g. The economic
intuition is that at q = q –, too few assets are created through inventories
(whose value is q –I0). Equilibrium in global asset markets then requires a
CABALLERO, FARHI, and GOURINCHAS 17
15. Figure 9 is drawn for the case where θδ/(1 +α ) < g < θ (δ+α )/(1 +α ), where the
ﬁrst inequality is a consequence of assumption 1. The case where g > θ (δ+α )/(1 +α ) is
similar and also features a downward-sloping saddle path, but the q . = 0 schedule is down-
ward sloping.
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Figure 9. The Model with Inventories When σ  1
11472-01_Caballero_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  12:16 PM  Page 17low interest rate. But when r0 < g, the (normalized) price of commodities
declines over time, and this increases demand for commodities and reduces
inventories (I
.
0 < 0). Instead, the equilibrium requires that the price of com-
modities be sufﬁciently high initially to depress the demand for commodi-
ties and allow inventory accumulation (I
.
0 > 0). Equivalently, the price of
commodities needs to rise sufﬁciently to depress equilibrium interest rates
and make inventory accumulation proﬁtable. This is represented by point A
in figure 9. This high initial price depresses interest rates below r0. Over
time, since rt < g, (normalized) commodity prices decrease, and this
increases demand for commodities and slows inventory accumulation. The
steady state is reached at point C.
The price of commodities performs a dual role in the model with inven-
tories: it influences the demand for the Z good on the spot market, and it
inﬂuences the global supply of assets in the economy (Vt + ptIt). As in tra-
ditional models of portfolio balance, it is the tension between these two
functions that generates interesting dynamics.
16
BUBBLES. Now let us turn to the opposite extreme, where bubbles exist
and do not vanish asymptotically relative to the size of the economy. In the
limit, since we assumed d > λ, there are no inventories. Without invento-
ries, the Z good is for consumption only, and its price rises at rate g. The
interest rate rt converges to g, and the bubble converges to
The size of the asymptotic bubble in expression 14 is the same as that of
the asymptotic equilibrium inventories pI in the bubbleless equilibrium
(equation 13). In both cases the endogenous increase in asset supply is just
sufﬁcient to increase the equilibrium interest rate to g.
THE NO-INVENTORY ECONOMY (A BENCHMARK). In our model the price of
the Z good is both a relative price and, when inventories are nonzero, an
asset price. To illustrate the importance of this dual role, we describe a
benchmark economy where the inventory channel is turned off. That is, we
assume that storage costs are prohibitive (d is very large), so the Z good
cannot be stored.
This benchmark economy has two long-run steady states: a bubbly one
and a bubbleless one. The bubbly steady state is exactly as above, with the
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16. See Kouri (1983) and, more recently, Blanchard, Giavazzi, and Sa (2005) for
examples of portfolio balance models.
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less equilibrium, market clearing for the Z good implies that pt grows at
rate g. Equilibrium in asset markets implies that the interest rate rt is equal
to r
ref < g.
Note that assumption 1 implies that the interest rate r
ref in the bubbleless
equilibrium of the no-inventory economy is lower than the interest rate g in
the bubbleless equilibrium of the economy with inventories. The reason
forthisdifferenceisthattotalassetsupplyissmallerintheeconomywithout
inventories. Note also that pt is the same in the bubbly equilibrium and in
the bubbleless equilibrium without inventories. That is, the price is entirely
determined by the relative endowments of the X good and the Z good and
is completely decoupled from the asset market.
The Financial Crash and Commodity Boom (Phase I)
Suppose now that a “subprime” shock takes place. This can be inter-
preted as the realization that ﬁnancial instruments are less sound than they
were previously perceived to be. It could result, inter alia, from the realiza-
tion that corporate governance is less benign than once thought (excessive
risk taking and poor risk management by investment banks) or that securi-
tization and certiﬁcation by rating agencies involve important agency
problems; or from a signiﬁcant loss of informed and intermediation capital
(deleveraging of commercial and investment banks hit by losses); and so
on. All of these factors and more have been mentioned in the events sur-
rounding the recent subprime crisis.
17 We assume that this shock is com-
pletely unanticipated, but this is not crucial to our analysis as long as there
is some degree of market incompleteness, preventing agents from fully
hedging away their risk.
In the model we capture this shock with a bursting of the bubble B at
date t0. The dynamics that follow are described by those in the bubble-
less system and are illustrated in ﬁgure 10 for the case where σ=1. Right
before the shock, the economy is at point A with qt0 = q – and no inventories
(It0 = 0). When the crisis erupts, the price of commodities jumps to point B
on the saddle path. With decreased demand in the spot market, the economy
immediately begins to build inventories (which could be kept under the
ground). The price of commodities remains high until the economy con-
verges to the new steady state (point C).
The collapse of the bubble reduces asset supply and leads to a drop in
the interest rate. Lower interest rates make more attractive the strategy
CABALLERO, FARHI, and GOURINCHAS 19
17. See Greenlaw and others (2008) and Brunnermeier (2009).
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buildup in inventories. Higher commodity prices during the transition to
the new long-run equilibrium are required to lower demand and restore
equilibrium in the Z good market. The commodity price jumps at t = t0
and then declines asymptotically from above to the same path as in the
pre-crash economy.
The interest rate initially drops by
and then converges smoothly back to the asymptotic level g. There are two
terms on the right-hand side of equation 15. The first, “bubble-burst”
term, −gBt 0 −/Wt 0 −, is directly due to the collapse of the bubble. The second,
“commodity-price-jump” term follows from the increase in the price of the
Z good, which raises the rate of wealth accumulation. Since inventories are
only gradually accumulated, an additional gap opens between asset supply
and asset demand, which requires a further decline in interest rates.
In the benchmark no-inventory economy, the normalized price of com-
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Figure 10. Subprime Crisis at t0 When σ  1
11472-01_Caballero_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  12:16 PM  Page 20at point A in ﬁgure 10. Since the price of commodities does not jump, the
second term in equation 15 would equal zero, and the interest rate drop
would be entirely given by the bubble-burst term.
18
Note that there is a strong ﬂight-to-quality feature in the model, since
both the value of accumulated savings and the total value of assets are con-
tinuous at t = t0:
This means that the decline in interest rates raises the value of the trees (the
“good” asset) enough to fully offset the loss in value due to the collapse of
the bubble. Later we will show that when σ < 1, the decline in the interest
rate is more pronounced than in the σ=1 case, which further raises the
value of the remaining “good” assets.
19
The Growth Slowdown (Phase II)
Eventually, the ﬁnancial crisis starts to hurt global growth prospects.
We capture this turn of events by assuming that at t = t1, global growth
slows unexpectedly and permanently from g to g ˆ < g. In the long run the
slowdown reduces inventories I
–
. In fact, from equation 13 we see that if
the growth slowdown is sufﬁciently severe as to reverse assumption 1, the
commodity bubble ultimately bursts, and I
–
= 0. We formalize this with
the following assumption:
Assumption 2: A severe growth slowdown occurs: g ˆ < δθ/(1 +α ).
Under assumption 2, inventories are not sustainable in the long run. The
dynamics that follow the growth slowdown are illustrated in ﬁgure 11. At
time t1 the economy is at point D, with inventory levels It1 and a commodity
price qt1. Following the shock, the price of commodities needs to collapse
so as to pick up the slack from the decreased rate of inventory accumula-
tion. Equivalently, the collapse in commodity prices from point D to point E
pushes equilibrium interest rates to rt > g ˆ, making inventory accumulation
WV BW V X
tt t t t t 00 0 00 0
1





CABALLERO, FARHI, and GOURINCHAS 21
18. We know from the previous analysis that the interest rate would drop to rref =
δθ/(1 +α ).
19. Note that if we were to use a true consumer price index (rather than the price of good
X) to deﬂate quantities, wealth would always drop in real terms after a crash. This alternative
numeraire formulation, which we develop in appendix C (online), modiﬁes the “language”
but none of our substantive conclusions.
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20 Over time, inventories converge to I
–
= 0, while commodity
prices increase back to q – (point A), and the interest rate converges to r
ref.
By contrast, in the no-inventory economy, the commodity price and the
interest rate would not be impacted at t = t1. The economy would remain
indeﬁnitely at point A in ﬁgure 11.
Global Imbalances in the Long Run
Let us now examine global equilibrium in a world with two large regions,
i = {U,M}. We interpret region U as the United States, with initially good
but perhaps fragile ﬁnancial conditions, and region M as the set of emerg-
22 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
20. Note that although rt
+
1 > g ˆ, the interest rate can increase or decrease when the growth
shock hits, depending on the level of inventories It1, because a decrease in commodity prices
reduces both asset supply (the value of inventories decreases) and asset demand (the value of the
ﬂow of Z goods decreases). When It1 is small, the asset supply curve shifts less than the asset
demand curve, requiring an increase in the interest rate to clear the asset market. We can 
compute the increase in interest rates,  ,
where the second term on the right-hand side is negligible if It1 is small. Note that despite this
potential increase at impact, the interest rate eventually converges to a lower level, since
r
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Figure 11. Growth Slowdown at t1 When σ  1
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offset the U.S. deﬁcit.
Each of the regions is described by the same setup as the world economy,
with an instantaneous return rt from hoarding a unit of either region’s trees;
rt is common across both regions and satisﬁes
where V
i
t is the value of region i’s trees at time t. We assume initially that
both regions have common parameters g, δ, and θ, but that the initial bub-
ble is concentrated in the U region. The latter assumption captures the idea
that the U region has more attractive assets than the M region. Moreover,
we assume that the Z good is produced only in the M economy and that the
potential inventories are held in this region (perhaps under the ground; see
the later discussion). These two features are all that differentiates the two
regions, aside from scale.
Let W
i
t denote the savings accumulated by agents in region i at date t.
By analogy with equation 7:
where 1{i=M} is an indicator for region M. Adding equations 16 and 17 for U
and M shows that the world economy is exactly that described in the ﬁrst
section, with
The current account balance CAt
U of region U represents the net accumula-
tion of assets by region U and is given by
Let us start from the steady state with bubbles and σ=1 as described
in the preceding section. Figure 12 represents graphically the external
equilibrium in U in a Metzler diagram.
21 The curve labeled VU/XU represents
the long-run value of the U tree, relative to output. It is equal to δ/r and
decreases with the interest rate r. The curve labeled W
U/X
U represents the
long-run value of the savings-to-output ratio, as a function of the equilibrium
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21. Metzler (1968).
11472-01_Caballero_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  12:16 PM  Page 23interest rate. It is equal to (1 −δ+gδ/r)/(θ+g − r). It ﬁrst decreases and
then increases with r.
22
Without bubbles or inventories, long-run ﬁnancial autarky is achieved
at point A, with r =δ θ . Under ﬁnancial integration, but still without bubbles
or inventories, the interest rate is lower, at r
ref =δ θ /(1 +α ). The reason for
the lower equilibrium interest rate is that a larger fraction of global output is
not capitalized when there are commodities. The lower interest rate allows
U to supply more assets to M and to run a current account deﬁcit that is
proportional to the distance between points B and C in ﬁgure 12.
In the presence of the bubble, the supply of assets increases from
V
U/X























24 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
22. Although the asset demand schedule W





U, equal to (1 −δ θ /r)/(θ+g − r), is always increasing with the inter-
est rate. The downward-sloping part of the W
U/XU curve comes from the impact of interest
rates on asset demand through the new trees gV
U. When g < δθ, the WU/XU curve has the
shape shown in ﬁgure 12. When g >  δθ, the asset and demand curves cross on the
downward-sloping part of the asset demand curve W
U/XU.















Figure 12. Metzler Diagram When σ  1
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is such that the world equilibrium interest rate increases from r
ref to g.
The current account deﬁcit in the bubble equilibrium (proportional to the
distance between points D and E) is always larger than in the no-bubble,
no-inventories case (the distance between points B and C).
23 The reason
for this larger current account deﬁcit is that a disproportionate share of M’s
income is noncapitalizable (because its commodity income, pZ, is non-
capitalizable unless it is transformed into inventories), whereas U produces
a disproportionate share of global assets.
Long-Run Imbalances with No Growth Slowdown
As before, the subprime shock takes place at t = t0. In the long run the
presence of commodities leads to a larger global rebalancing in response to
a subprime shock in the United States (region U). Consider ﬁrst what hap-
pens if there is no growth slowdown. In this case, since the asymptotic
interest rate in the absence of bubbles is still r = g, the asymptotic current
account deﬁcit of the U region following the collapse of the bubble is
smaller by exactly the size of the bubble:
This asymptotic current account will be in deﬁcit if the degree of dynamic
inefficiency in the global economy is not too severe (δθ > g), as is
assumed in ﬁgure 12. Otherwise the buildup in inventories is signiﬁcant,
which increases the supply of assets in region M and reduces its need to
buy foreign assets as a store of value.
This buildup of inventories implies that endogenous commodity prices
lead to more rebalancing in the long run. The reason is that inventories
contribute to increasing asset supply in region M and hence endogenously
reduce the effective asymmetry between the two regions. In terms of fig-
ure 12, the current account deﬁcit contracts from D − E to D − F, as the
bubble collapses and inventories are accumulated, whereas it would contract
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23. Indeed, the increase in the current account deﬁcit in the presence of the bubble can
be computed as
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long run. We will see in the next section that this result can be overturned
in the short run when σ < 1.
Long-Run Imbalances with a Growth Slowdown
Let us now reintroduce the slowdown in growth. Under assumption 2
the asymptotic interest rate drops to r
ref. Figure 13 describes what hap-
pens to U’s asymptotic external imbalances as growth declines. The asset
demand curve rotates clockwise around point A, so that asset demand
decreases in the relevant range (r < δθ).
The asymptotic net foreign asset position NA
U/XU = (WU − VU)/XU can
be read as the distance G − C. Since there are no inventories and r = r
ref, it
is the same as in the benchmark no-inventory economy and worsens as the
growth rate g ˆ declines. Further, this asymptotic net foreign asset position is
more negative with the growth slowdown (G − C) than without it (D − F).
The reason is that slower growth eliminates the buildup in commodity
inventories and hence curtails the expansion in asset supply in the M region.
The inventory channel analyzed above, which reduces the asymmetry
between the two regions, is now dampened, and the economy experiences
less rebalancing in the long run. However, since growth is also slower in the
26 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
















Figure 13. Long-Run External Imbalances When σ  1
11472-01_Caballero_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  12:16 PM  Page 26former case, the current account may or may not worsen asymptotically
with a growth slowdown.
24
Global Imbalances in the Short Run
We now turn to a phase-by-phase analysis of the model’s implications for
short-run global imbalances.
Phase I: The Financial Crisis
The behavior of the current account in the short run depends on the ini-
tial portfolios, the degree of home portfolio bias, and the degree of substi-
tution between the commodity and the general consumption good. As in our
earlier paper,
25 we assume an extreme form of home bias: at t = t0 all the
assets held by agents in the U region are U assets. Moreover, we assume
that domestic residents’ portfolios are proportional to the relative value of
trees and bubbles. The assumption of extreme portfolio home bias is a
good approximation of actual conditions. As of 2005, Piet Sercu and
Rosanne Vanpée found that the degree of home bias for equities varied
between 0.31 for the Netherlands and 0.91 for Japan.
26 The assumption
that domestic residents’ portfolios are proportional to the relative value of
trees and bubbles implies that M has a signiﬁcant exposure to U’s bubble
asset. Again, this is a reasonable assumption. The onset of the U.S. sub-
prime crisis was marked by the failure of a small German bank, IKB, and
a few months later by the collapse of Northern Rock, a U.K. bank, high-
lighting the exposure of foreign investors to tainted U.S. assets.
27






0, is given by the sum of two terms: the adjustment in the trade balance
Xt
U −θ Wt
U, and the change in payments on external debt, through asset
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24. The asymptotic current account deﬁcit is now  and decreases
with g ˆ.
25. Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008).
26. Sercu and Vanpée (2007). The degree of home equity bias is deﬁned as one minus the
ratio of the share of foreign equities in the domestic and world portfolios. It varies between
zero (when the weight on foreign equities is given by their relative market capitalization)
and one (when investors hold no foreign equities). It has declined in recent years but remains
very high for most countries.
27. According to Beltran, Pounder, and Thomas (2008, table 6), foreigners hold 40 per-
cent ($2.4 trillion out of $6 trillion) of outstanding U.S.-asset-backed securities and about
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is swamped by the adjustment in the trade balance when the external debt









0 + Bt −
0) represents the share invested in the domestic
tree and the domestic bubble before the crash; μt −
0 < 1 when U is a net
debtor at time t0. At impact, the direct effect of the bubble collapse is a
reduction in wealth W
U
t0, which lowers consumption and improves the trade
balance.
28 Note that there is always less trade rebalancing in this economy
than in the benchmark no-inventory economy.
29 The change in the trade





0 are exactly proportional to the change in
the value of the U assets, VU
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0. As a starting point, note that when
σ=1, the decline in asset prices is exactly the same in the economy with




t0/Xt0 is the share of U in world output. This result is peculiar
to the case σ=1 because the share of X goods in consumption is invariant
to the price pt of Z goods.30
Phase II: The Growth Slowdown
Consider now the effects of the growth slowdown shock. We maintain
the assumption of extreme home bias, so that immediately before the
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28. However, in equilibrium the drop in wealth is dampened because interest rates plum-
met, raising the value of the “good” U asset and making up for part of the drop in wealth.
29. In appendix D (online) we show that the difference in trade rebalancing between
these two economies is strictly less than the direct effect of the change in the terms of trade
resulting from speculation in commodities, holding imports and exports constant. In other
words, imported and exported quantities adjust by more in the economy with endogenous
commodity prices than in the no-inventory economy.
30. In contrast, we show in appendix C (online) that in the more realistic σ < 1 case, the








0, is larger when
commodity prices are endogenous than when they are not. The reason for the larger increase
in the value of U assets is that the share of X goods in value added decreases, which raises
asset demand relative to asset supply. As a result of this gap, asset supply has to increase by
more in equilibrium. This “petrodollar” channel will prove crucial later in our quantitative
exercises. This effect is absent in the benchmark no-inventory economy, which would as a
result experience a greater amount of rebalancing in the short run.
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1. The change in the value of U assets can be computed
as above. We show in appendix C (online) that when It1 is small and σ=1,
the impact of the growth slowdown on the trade balance is negligible. By
contrast, when σ < 1, the decline in the value of U assets is accentuated,
and the trade balance improves at impact. We show in the calibration sec-
tion that most of this improvement originates in an improvement in the
commodity component of the trade balance.
Back-of-the-Envelope Calculations
This section gauges the order of magnitude of the effects discussed
above. We focus here on the impact effect of the ﬁnancial crisis, which we
can develop analytically, and discuss the full dynamics in the next sec-
tion. We find from this back-of-the-envelope exercise that our model
can explain much of the observed decline in real interest rates and rise in
the price of oil in the ﬁrst phase of the ﬁnancial crisis, as well as the sharp
collapse in the price of oil in the second phase. The model also goes a long
way toward explaining why the U.S. current account adjustment has been
only modest so far, but it forecasts that the decline in the price of oil will
reduce the trade deﬁcit signiﬁcantly in the future.
PHASE I: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS. We begin with the impact of the crisis on
interest rates. According to ﬁgure 2, real interest rates declined by about
1.75 percentage points between September 2006, when home prices started
to decline and the current account turned around, and June 2008.
31 With a
unit elasticity of substitution, σ=1, the change in interest rates is given by
equation 15; when this elasticity is smaller than one, the drop in interest
rates rt +
0 − rt −
0 can still be expressed as the sum of two terms: a bubble-burst
term reﬂecting the direct impact of the collapse of the bubble on asset sup-
ply, and a commodity-price-jump term reﬂecting the impact of the increase
in the price of commodities on global asset supply and demand.
32
The starting point in assessing the role of the two terms is an estimate of
the size of the perceived losses generated by the ﬁnancial crisis, in relation
to the world’s ﬁnancial wealth: Bt −
0/Wt −
0. Estimates of the perceived size of
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31. The world short-term real interest rate dropped from 1.6 percent to −0.9 percent. The
U.S. long-term real rate dropped from 2.4 percent to 1.4 percent.
32. See appendix C (online) for an expression for the commodity-price-jump term.
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imprecise. A key issue is that the endogenous response of interest rates off-
sets the impact of the crash in Bt on global wealth.
33 Empirically, this means
that the estimates of the size of the initial bubble that we obtain are likely
to be biased downward.
Direct losses in U.S. mortgage markets alone are estimated to be in the
vicinity of $500 billion.
34 In its April 2008 Global Financial Stability
Report,
35 the International Monetary Fund reaches a similar estimate of
aggregate losses in the U.S. residential mortgage market. Adding to this
the potential losses to broader credit markets, the IMF calculates aggre-
gate losses from writedowns of U.S. loans and securitized assets of about
$945 billion.
36 To these losses we add the declines in asset values generated
by the broad process of deleveraging and the associated contraction in lend-
ing across markets. For instance, David Greenlaw and coauthors estimate
an overall contraction of $2.3 trillion in intermediaries’ balance sheets.
37
Moreover, mortgage market losses reﬂect only the increased rate of delin-
quencies on prime mortgages and commercial real estate (as well as the
declining value of foreclosed properties). To this we add the decline in
housing wealth for residential borrowers that remain in good standing
on their mortgages. Estimates of the latter signiﬁcantly exceed the direct
losses in mortgage markets. For instance, the Federal Reserve estimates
households’ housing wealth at $19.4 trillion as of June 2006.
38 In terms of
the Case-Shiller U.S. Composite 10 home price index, U.S. housing prices
declined 19.8 percent in nominal terms between September 2006 and June
2008 (see ﬁgure 4). If this decline is across the board, it implies that at least
an additional $3.8 trillion was wiped out in U.S. housing wealth alone.
39
Adding these estimates yields a total loss in U.S. housing wealth and
mortgage markets in the range of $2 trillion to $4 trillion. What is relevant
in our calculation is the ratio of these initial losses to the world’s ﬁnancial
wealth Wt −
0. We construct a crude estimate of the latter at the onset of the
30 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
33. For instance, we have seen that in the case of a unit elasticity (σ=1), aggregate
wealth remains unchanged at impact.
34. Greenlaw and others (2008).
35. IMF (2008a).
36. In its October 2008 report (IMF 2008b), the IMF revised its estimate of U.S.
declared losses on loans and securitized assets to $1.4 trillion.
37. Greenlaw and others (2008).
38. See table B.100 of the March 2008 release of the Flow of Funds Accounts.
39. This ﬁgure is calculated under the extreme assumption that all mortgage market
losses are housing market losses. Of course, foreclosures and repossessions generate addi-
tional losses beyond the decline in housing values.
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2005, and an estimate of the ﬁnancial wealth of the rest of the world of
$80.7 trillion.
40 This indicates an initial size of the bubble of between 1.5
and 3.0 percent of the world’s ﬁnancial wealth. In what follows we assume
an initial bubble equal to 2 percent of the world’s ﬁnancial wealth.
It is immediately apparent that the bubble-burst term in equation 15,
equal to −gBt −
0/Wt −
0, is relatively small: at an output growth rate of around
3 percent, it is equal to only −0.06 percent. On the other hand, the com-
modity-price-jump term can be substantial. To show this, table 1 reports
estimates of the decline in r for different values of the elasticity of sub-
stitution σ and different estimates of the increase in commodity prices.
The calculation of the commodity-price-jump term requires an estimate of
the average expenditure share of commodities szt−
0. In constructing the table
we assume that szt−
0 = 0.04, which corresponds to the average share of oil
expenditure in world GDP in 2005 and 2006.
41
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40. See table B.100 of the June 2008 issue of the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds
Accounts for the U.S. ﬁgure. To obtain an estimate of the ﬁnancial wealth of the rest of the
world in 2006, we calculate the ratio of output to financial wealth for the United States,
the European Union, and Japan between 1982 and 2004. We ﬁnd a GDP-weighted average
of 2.48 (see Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas 2008 for additional details). Applying this
ratio to the GDP of the rest of the world in 2005, we obtain $80.7 trillion. To the extent that
many countries are less financially developed than the United States, Europe, or Japan,
this estimate likely overstates the world’s ﬁnancial wealth. This would further bias down-
ward our estimate of Bt0/Wt0.
41. According to the Energy Information Administration’s International Petroleum
Monthly (table 2.4, World Petroleum Demand), world demand for oil in 2005 was 83.8 million
barrels a day. At a WTI price of $56.64 a barrel, this corresponds to $1.7 trillion a year, or
3.8 percent of world GDP. In 2006 the share of oil in total expenditure was 4.16 percent. The
remaining parameters are discussed in more detail in a later section.
Table 1. Predicted Change in World Interest Rates for Different Parameter Valuesa
Percentage points
Change in commodity prices, 
Elasticity of substitution σ 1.0 1.2 1.5 2.0 3.0
0.05 −2.22 −2.23 −2.25 −2.28 −2.37
0.1 −1.02 −1.04 −1.08 −1.16 −1.33
0.2 −0.44 −0.48 −0.55 −0.69 −1.00
0.5 −0.12 −0.21 −0.37 −0.66 −1.27
1.0 −0.06 −0.23 −0.50 −0.93 −1.80
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the model described in the text.
a. Each cell reports the model-predicted initial change in the world interest rate  associated with
the indicated change in commodity prices at the indicated value of σ. Italicized numbers correspond to
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constant 2008 dollars increased from $67.81 to $140.82 (ﬁgure 7). Inter-
preting this surge as the direct effect of the crisis yields pt +
0/pt −
0 = 2.08. The
associated decrease in real interest rates in table 1 is consistent with what
we see in the data. For a realistically low level of the short-term price
elasticity of demand σ=0.1, we ﬁnd a decline in interest rates of 1.16 per-
centage points, smaller than the 1.75 percentage points observed over that
period, but much larger than the 0.06-percentage-point decline associated
with the direct effect of the collapse of the bubble. Most of the decline in
interest rates comes from the indirect effect of higher commodity prices,
hinting that the endogenous response of commodity prices to the subprime
crisis is critical in understanding the global macroeconomic environment.
We now turn to the effect of the crash on commodity prices. We can
compute the decline in U’s ﬁnancial wealth and ﬁnd an expression for the
jump in commodity prices as a function of the decline in U’s wealth and
the size of the original collapse of the bubble (see online appendix C):
We already have estimates for Bt −
0/Wt −
0 and szt−
0. We estimate the decline in





0 from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds
Accounts. Between June 2007 and March 2008, U.S. households’ ﬁnancial
wealth declined by $1.65 trillion, or 11.5 percent of output.
42 Next we con-
struct an estimate of µt −
0, the share of domestic ﬁnancial wealth invested in
the domestic tree and the domestic bubble before the crash. In 2005 the net
foreign liabilities of the United States amounted to $1.85 trillion, or 15 per-
cent of U.S. GDP.




0 − Bt −
0)/XU
t0. Substituting
the expression for µt −




0 = 4.16, we obtain
µt −
0 = 0.96.44 Finally, we set the ratio of U.S. to world output in 2005 at
approximately 0.25.
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42. See table B.100 of the June 2008 Federal Reserve Flow of Funds estimates. House-
hold net worth was $57.6 trillion in June 2007 at the onset of the crisis and only $55.9 trillion
in March 2008.
43. From table 2 of the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s International Investment Posi-
tion. The net asset position is estimated at market value.
44. This represents an overestimate of the share of U.S. assets held by U.S. investors,
since we assume an extreme form of home bias.
45. U.S. GDP in 2005 was $12.4 trillion, and world GDP was about $45 trillion, for a ratio
of 0.276. Although the theoretical model refers only to U and M, in this back-of-the-envelope
exercise and the simulations that follow, it is natural to include other countries as part of M.
11472-01_Caballero_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  12:16 PM  Page 32modity prices as a function of the elasticity σ and the size of the initial
bubble collapse Bt −
0/Wt −
0.
The results in table 2 support our view that the collapse in the U.S. hous-
ingmarket and the contraction in credit markets played a significant role
in explaining the surge in commodity prices that followed the subprime
crisis. We ﬁnd that for our benchmark estimate of the size of the bubble of
2 percent, commodity prices increase by 98 percent when the short-run
elasticity of substitution equals 0.1, which is very close to the 108 percent
observed in the data. Recall that without an asset channel (in the benchmark
no-inventories economy), commodity prices would not jump when the
crisis occurs.
Turning to the external accounts, between September 2006 and June
2008 the U.S. trade deﬁcit on goods and services decreased from −5.96 per-
cent of U.S. GDP to −4.94 percent, a 1.02-percentage-point improvement.
46
Can the model explain this very limited rebalancing? We answer this ques-
tion by rewriting the trade balance equation (equation 19) as
The ﬁrst term inside the curved brackets represents the direct impact of the
collapse of the bubble on the trade balance. It contributes positively to
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46. See the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s National Income and Product Accounts,
table 4.1.
Table 2. Predicted Effect of the Subprime Crisis on Commodity Pricesa
Percentage points
Initial size of the ﬁnancial bubble as share of world 
ﬁnancial wealth,  (percent)
Elasticity of substitution σ 1 2 34 5
0.05 1.11 1.91 2.73 3.57 4.42
0.1 1.11 1.98 2.89 3.83 4.80
0.2 1.13 2.16 3.30 4.53 5.83
0.5 1.21 3.42 6.76 11.22 16.81
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the model described in the text.
a. Each cell reports the model-predicted change in commodity prices  associated with the indi-








11472-01_Caballero_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  12:16 PM  Page 33prices. Table 3 reports the sum of the direct and indirect impacts of the
subprime crisis on the trade balance as a function of the commodity price
surge pt +
0/pt −
0 and the size of the initial bubble Bt −
0/Wt −
0 for an elasticity of sub-
stitution σ equal to 0.1.
The ﬁrst line of the table reports the change in the trade balance in the
benchmark no-inventory economy (which coincides with the direct effect).
We ﬁnd a large and implausible improvement in the trade balance. For
instance, for an initial bubble equal to 2 percent of world ﬁnancial wealth,
the no-inventory economy predicts an improvement in the trade balance
equal to 6.02 percent of output. This is a far cry from the 1.02 percent
observed in the data. Again, once we introduce the “petrodollar” channel, the
required rebalancing drops signiﬁcantly. For instance, the trade balance
improves by “only” 2.55 percent of output, instead of 6.02 percent when
commodity prices double. If instead we consider a tripling of commodity
prices, or a smaller initial bubble collapse, it is possible for the trade bal-
ance to worsen on impact. Although our preferred numbers are on the high
side (2.5 percent of output compared with 1.02 percent), it is apparent that
the model has the capacity to rationalize the very limited global rebalanc-
ing that we are witnessing.
47
All in all, we conclude that the model is in the right ballpark and can
account for the broad features of the global economy in the ﬁrst phase of
the crisis.
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47. Calculations for the current account are very similar since when µt
−
0 is close to 1,
interest payments remain small.
Table 3. Predicted Effect of the Subprime Crisis on the Region U Trade Balancea
Percent of GDP
Initial size of the ﬁnancial bubble as share of world 
Change in commodity 
ﬁnancial wealth,  (percent)
prices,  1 2 34 5
1.0 3.01 6.02 9.04 12.05 15.06
1.2 2.30 5.31 8.32 11.33 14.34
1.5 1.24 4.26 7.27 10.28 13.29
2.0 −0.47 2.55 5.56 8.57 11.58
3.0 −3.77 −0.75 2.26 5.27 8.28
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the model described in the text.
a. Each cell reports the model-predicted change in the region U trade balance relative to the region’s
output  associated with the indicated size of the original bubble and the indicated change
in commodity prices, at an assumed elasticity of substitution σ=0.1. Italicized numbers correspond to the
authors’ preferred calibration.
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account for the broad features of the data following the slowdown in eco-
nomic activity. In real terms, between July and November 2008 oil prices
declined by 53 percent (see ﬁgure 7). We can use equation 21 to write the
change in commodity prices as
The change in commodity prices is a function of the drop in U’s ﬁnancial
wealth. Reasonable estimates of the ﬁnancial losses incurred since July
2008 are not available yet. Instead, table 4 reports predicted declines for a








t1 and different values of the short-run
demand elasticity for commodities.
It is immediately apparent that commodity prices are extremely sensitive
to the drop in ﬁnancial wealth. For σ=0.1, a modest decline in U.S. ﬁnan-
cial wealth equal to 10 percent of output triggers a staggering 58 percent
(0.42 − 1) decline in commodity prices. This is remarkably close to the
53 percent decline observed in the data.
Table 5 reports the predicted change in the trade balance as a function




lation is independent of σ. This part of the analysis is necessarily more
speculative. It indicates that the model predicts a signiﬁcant rebalancing of
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Table 4. Predicted Effect of the Growth Slowdown on Commodity Pricesa
Percent
Change in region U ﬁnancial wealth, 
(percent)
Elasticity of substitution σ− 0.05 −0.10 −0.15 −0.17
0.05 0.72 0.44 0.17 0.07
0.1 0.70 0.42 0.16 0.06
0.2 0.67 0.38 0.12 0.04
0.5 0.53 0.21 0.03 0.01
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the model described in the text.
a. Each cell reports the model-predicted change in commodity prices  associated with the indi-
cated change in region U ﬁnancial wealth at the indicated value of σ. Italicized numbers correspond to
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We now turn to an analysis of full general-equilibrium dynamic simulations.
We begin with a discussion of plausible short- and long-run elasticities of
demand for commodities. We then present the results from dynamic simu-
lations of the ﬁnancial crisis with and without a growth slowdown.
Short- and Long-Run Elasticities
A key parameter of our model is the elasticity of substitution σ. William
Nordhaus finds low “apparent” short-run price elasticities of demand of
around 0.3 at the time of the 1973 oil price shock.
48 Long-run elasticities are
typically higher, since with time, energy users can substitute away from
energy-intensive technology. Nordhaus notes that for many components of
the physical capital stock, energy substitution is possible only when the
existing capital is scrapped. In the transportation sector, for instance, in
which energy consumption depends in large part on the fuel efﬁciency of
the outstanding stock of vehicles, energy consumption responds gradually
as old vehicles are slowly replaced with more-fuel-efﬁcient ones. Similarly,
in the case of electric power generation, there is almost no possibility for
substitution in the short run, but in the long run utilities can switch to other
sources such as nuclear or wind power.
More recent studies conﬁrm the “crude” estimates in Nordhaus’s analy-
sis for the short run while ﬁnding higher long-run estimates.
49 The typical
estimates for short-run price elasticities vary between 0.05 and 0.35; long-
run estimates vary between 0.21 and 0.86.
50
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48. Nordhaus (1980).
49. See Roy and others (2006) and Dahl and Sterner (1991) for older surveys.
50. See Hamilton (2008) for a recent discussion of crude oil prices, and the references
therein.
Table 5. Predicted Effect of a Growth Slowdown on the Region U Trade Balancea
Percent of GDP
Change in region U ﬁnancial wealth, 
(percent of GDP)
−0.05 −0.10 −0.15 −0.17
Change in region U trade balance,  1.09 2.18 3.27 3.70
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the model described in the text.
a. Each cell reports the model-predicted change in the region U trade balance relative to the region’s
output associated with the indicated change in region U ﬁnancial wealth. Italicized numbers correspond
to the authors’ preferred calibration.
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estimates for the period around the recent increase in oil prices. The table
reports recent data on U.S. petroleum consumption and prices before and
after 2003, where the break in oil prices is apparent in ﬁgure 7. Between
2003 and 2007, petroleum prices increased by an average of 8.55 percent a
year, a sharp break from the 1.44 percent average annual increase between
1988 and 2003. Nevertheless, annual growth in demand for petroleum
products slowed only from 0.84 percent to 0.61 percent. The “apparent”
price elasticity is calculated as by Nordhaus, under the assumption of a unit
elasticity of petroleum product demand to GDP, as the (opposite of the)
percentage slowdown in energy demand corrected for the percentage change
in real output growth, divided by the percentage acceleration in prices.
51 We
obtain an estimate of 0.04, on the low end of available empirical estimates.
52
This is consistent with recent empirical estimates that ﬁnd an even smaller
short-run price elasticity now than in the 1970s.
53
A simple way of capturing this time variation in σ is to assume that the
elasticity of substitution remains signiﬁcantly smaller than 1 until the share
of expenditure on the Z good reaches a certain exogenous level s –
z. When
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51. The income elasticity of petroleum demand is largely irrelevant in these calculations,
since output growth was essentially the same over both subperiods. This elasticity in industrial
countries has declined signiﬁcantly since the oil price shocks of the 1970s and is now closer
to 0.5. However, the income elasticities of emerging markets and oil-producing countries
appear to be much closer to, or even above, unity. See Gately and Huntington (2002) and the
discussion in Hamilton (2008).
52. Interestingly, the same calculations for residential demand for petroleum products
(not reported here) yield a much larger apparent elasticity of 0.78. The price elasticity is
lowest for the industrial and transport sectors, for which it is close to zero.
53. Hughes, Knittel, and Sperling (2008) ﬁnd a short-run price elasticity of between
0.03 and 0.08 between 2001 and 2006.
Table 6. Apparent Price Elasticity of U.S. Petroleum Demanda
Percent a year
1988–2003 2003–07
Change in real price of petroleum products
b 1.44 8.55
Change in U.S. demand for petroleum products 0.84 0.61
Apparent elasticity
c 0.04
Memorandum: average change in U.S. real GDP 2.83 2.90
Sources: Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Review, tables 3.1 and 3.3; Monthly
Energy Review, tables 2.2–2.6.
a. All data are compound annual averages.
b. Consumer price estimate through 2005; fossil fuel composite price after 2005.
c. Assumes a sectoral elasticity with respect to GDP of unity.
11472-01_Caballero_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  12:16 PM  Page 37that level is reached, we assume that the elasticity of substitution becomes
equal to 1. This transition is fully anticipated by economic agents. Conti-
nuity of the demand schedule also requires that α differ as the economy
transitions from σ < 1 to σ=1.
54 We denote α′ as the preference parameter
after the switch to σ=1.
The Dynamic System and the U.S. Financial Shock
We now characterize the full dynamic path of the economy in response
to a U.S. ﬁnancial collapse. We start the economy on the dynamic path of
the bubble equilibrium with σ < 1 and a given level of global imbalances.
At t = t0, the bubble collapses and the economy jumps to the dynamic path
of the bubbleless equilibrium. Appendix D (online) provides a complete
exposition of the dynamic system and the transitions that occur between
the different regimes.
Calibration of the dynamic path requires that we provide values for
the following parameters: the capitalization ratio δ, the growth rate of the
economy g, the relative sizes of U and M, the elasticity of substitution σ,
the propensity to consume out of ﬁnancial wealth θ, and the share of com-
modity expenditures s –
z when the elasticity of substitution becomes unitary.
We adopt a mixed approach, setting the values of some parameters on the
basis of plausible values and calibrating others so as to reproduce key fea-
tures of the data.
We start by setting the growth rate of the X good to g = 0.03, which is
close to the average annual real growth rate of output in the United States
between 1950 and 2007 (3.28 percent). As discussed above, we assume
that U represents a quarter of the world’s output. We set σ equal to 0.3.
This is signiﬁcantly higher than the apparent elasticity estimate in table 6.
Nonetheless, as argued above, it is well within the range of estimates in the
empirical literature. Furthermore, this value of σ produces realistic levels
of adjustment in commodity prices in the model. It also implies that the
price of commodities increases initially at g/σ=10 percent in the equilib-
rium with bubble, accounting for some of the rapid increase in commodity
prices observed before the U.S. ﬁnancial crisis.
We set s –
z = 0.1, so that the long-run model takes over when the expen-
diture share of commodities reaches 10 percent. This seems a reasonably
high value. In the data the share of oil in world output reached 4.16 percent
in 2006, up from 1.29 percent in 1998. In the simulation it would take
38 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
54. To see this, suppose that the transition occurs at some time T. Aggregate demand for
X goods right before T is given by WT– = [(1 +α pT
1−σ) XT]/θ. Right after the switch, it is equal
to WT+ = [(1 +α ′ ) XT]/θ. Continuity of commodity prices and wealth requires that αpT
1−σ =α ′ .
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yields α′ = 11.11 percent. Finally, we set the value of the world capitaliza-
tion index δ to 0.15, which corresponds to about half of the share of capital
in national accounts. As discussed in our previous paper, δ should be sub-
stantially lower than the capital share, since many forms of capital do not
generate capitalizable streams of revenue.
55 We then calibrate each region’s
δ so as to stabilize global imbalances before the crisis erupts. We obtain
δ
U = 0.144 and δ
M = 0.152.
56
The two remaining parameters to calibrate are θ and α. We set their val-
ues so as to control both the size of the initial bubble relative to aggregate
wealth at t=0, B0/W0=β 0, and the limit size of the bubble that would emerge
in the bubbly equilibrium under σ=1, β1 ≡ limt→∞ Bt/Wt. From equation
D2 in appendix D (online), we obtain limt→∞ Bt/Wt = 1 −δ θ /g(1 +α ′ ). For
given values of β0 and β1, we infer back the corresponding values of θ and α.
In practice we set β0 = 0.02, so that the collapse of the bubble represents
roughly 2 percent of the world’s wealth, as estimated in the previous section.
We set β1 = 1.01β0, so that the economy is not far from its long-run steady
state when the bubble collapses. (This ensures that the share of commodities
in expenditure is not too small.) We obtain θ=0.22 and α=0.40. We view
these values as plausible. As a point of reference, our earlier paper, using data
on U.S. household sector net worth and U.S. GDP, computed a value of θ=
0.25. (θcan be interpreted as the output–to–ﬁnancial wealth ratio.) These val-
ues imply that the economy is slightly dynamically inefﬁcient, since δθ/(1 +
α′) = 2.94 percent < g = 3 percent. Finally, we set the initial net foreign asset
position relative to U.S. output η=− 0.15, in line with estimates of the U.S.
net external debt position in 2006. Table 7 summarizes the parameter values.
Figure 14 reports the simulation obtained with these parameter values.
Before the crisis the real interest rate is slightly above 3.4 percent and
increasing, commodity prices (normalized) are equal to their steady-state
value q ˆ ≡ (α/Z)
1/σ, and both the trade balance and the current account are in
deﬁcit and improving (−3.5 percent and −4 percent of output, respectively).
At t = 0 the ﬁnancial crisis hits, wiping out 2 percent of aggregate ﬁnan-
cial wealth. The response of interest rates is quite stark (top left panel of
ﬁgure 14): they drop from about 3.5 percent to 2.7 percent. This decline is
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55. Our earlier paper (Caballero and others, 2008) assumed δ=0.12, at which the results
are largely unchanged.
56. Although the calibration sets δ
U slightly lower than δ
M, the “perceived” capitalization






0.156. In that sense the calibration is extreme in that it assumes that U has no fundamental
advantage in supplying stores of value.
11472-01_Caballero_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  12:16 PM  Page 39much larger than the mere 6 basis points in the benchmark economy
(dashed line in the top left panel). The fall in interest rates in the simulated
economy is strong enough to trigger inventory accumulation. As the top
right panel shows, the normalized price of commodities q ˆt = pt/Xt
1/σ jumps
2.3-fold and gradually converges back over the next 12 years. By contrast,
in the benchmark economy, the (normalized) price of commodities remains
unchanged and equal to q ˆ.
57 The jump in prices lowers the demand for
commodities and allows inventory accumulation. We ﬁnd that starting
from It0 = 0, inventories rise relatively slowly: it takes 12 years before their
market value pI peaks at 3.2 percent of world ﬁnancial wealth (middle left
panel). In the initial periods after the shock, in particular, inventories remain
very low, contributing little to the global supply of assets.
The middle right panel of ﬁgure 14 reports the current account balance
relative to output in the simulated economy and in the benchmark economy.
In both cases the current account improves as a result of the collapse of the
bubble. However, as conjectured in the previous section, the rebalancing is
much smaller in the economy with inventories. In the benchmark economy
the current account balance jumps from −4 percent of output to +2 percent,
an instant rebalancing of 6 percentage points. This is not surprising, given
that the bubble is located in the United States: the reduction in asset supply
40 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
57. This still implies that in the benchmark economy, pt increases at the rate g/σ, faster
than the rate of economic growth.
Table 7. Parameter Values Used in the Simulation
Parameter Value
Growth rate of output g 0.03
Elasticity of substitution σ 0.3
Share of U region output in world output X
U/X 0.25
Long-run expenditure share of commodities in output s –
x 0.1
Capitalization ratio δ 0.15
Initial value of ﬁnancial bubble as a fraction of world ﬁnancial wealth  2 percent
at time of ﬁnancial crisis β0
Long-term value of ﬁnancial bubble as a fraction of world ﬁnancial  2.02 percent
wealth in the bubbly equilibrium β1
Initial net foreign asset position in U region as a fraction of region’s  −0.15
output η
Inferred parameters
Preference for commodities α 0.40
Propensity to consume out of ﬁnancial wealth θ 0.22
Capitalization ratio in the U region δU 0.144
Capitalization ratio in the M region δM 0.152

































































Decomposition of trade balance
Figure 14. Dynamics of the Subprime Crisis Response in the Short and the Long Run
without a Growth Slowdown
11472-01_Caballero_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  12:16 PM  Page 41leads agents to move part of their ﬁnancial investments to M. By contrast,
in the simulated economy the rebalancing is “only” from −4 percent to 
−1.4 percent of GDP. As we discussed earlier, this is larger than the
rebalancing observed in the data, but of a similar order of magnitude.
Eventually, the rebalancing must become larger in the simulated economy,
to achieve a long-run current account balance of −0.6 percent compared
with −0.9 percent in the benchmark no-inventory economy. Nevertheless,
the role of commodities is to stabilize capital outﬂows for the ﬁrst four
years after the initial shock. The bottom left panel of ﬁgure 14 shows that
the implications for the trade balance are very similar, as discussed earlier.








1−σ). Underlying the muted response of the trade
balance, both the commodity and the noncommodity trade balances adjust
sharply. The commodity balance falls from −4.6 percent to −7.9 percent
of output, while the noncommodity balance jumps from 1.0 percent to
6.9 percent of output.
This asymmetric response of the commodity and noncommodity compo-
nents of the trade balance is consistent with the empirical evidence. Table 8
reports the change in the U.S. trade balance during the last two rebalanc-
ing episodes: 1987–89 and 2006–08.
58 The table shows that the recent
improvement in the U.S. trade balance comes entirely from the nonoil
component, which improved by more than 1.5 percent of GDP. By con-
trast, the oil balance worsened by 0.7 percent of GDP. When this rebalanc-
ing episode is compared with the previous episode, centered around 1987,
it is striking to note that oil prices played no role in attenuating the external
42 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
58. Milesi-Ferretti (2008) presents additional evidence on the contrast between the two
episodes.
Table 8. Change in the U.S. Trade Balance, Selected Periods
Percent of GDP
1980–89 1999–2008
1980–87 1987–89 1999–2006 2006–08
Total change in the trade balance −2.5 1.5 −2.8 0.8
Of which:
Change in balance of nonoil goods  −4.4 1.5 −1.4 1.5
and services
Change in oil balance 1.9 0.0 −1.4 −0.7
Source: Authors’ calculations from Bureau of Economic Analysis data.
11472-01_Caballero_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  12:16 PM  Page 42rebalancing then: the deﬁcit of the oil balance did not change between
1987 and 1989.
The Dynamic System and a Global Slowdown
The preceding results account for the negative correlation between U.S.
ﬁnancial assets and commodity prices that emerged in the ﬁrst phase of the
U.S. ﬁnancial crisis. Starting in July 2008, however, commodity prices
retreated dramatically. Bad news for commodities was also bad news for
U.S. and world ﬁnancial markets.
Of course, this global collapse has many causes, and a host of over-
shooting mechanisms are at work, from balance sheet multipliers, to margin
calls, to Knightian uncertainty, all of which contribute to the overall process
of deleveraging. Our framework is not suited to addressing the role of each
of these factors. Instead, we emphasize here the dramatic impact of a
global economic slowdown. To do so, we recalibrate our model assuming
that a moderate slowdown—a fall in annual global output growth from 
3 percent to 2 percent—takes place unexpectedly one year after the begin-
ning of the U.S. ﬁnancial crisis.
Such a decline in global growth is sufficiently large to ensure that
assumption 2 is satisﬁed, so that the tightness in global asset markets is
relieved. Figure 15 presents the results. In each panel the solid line reports
the simulation with a growth slowdown, and the dashed line reports the
simulation from ﬁgure 14, without a growth slowdown. The collapse in
global growth at t = 1 has dramatic consequences for asset and commodity
prices. First, slower growth reduces asset values. In the short run, however,
it leads to an even larger decline in asset demand. The result is an increase
in interest rates (top left panel) and a decline in asset prices (bottom right
panel).
59 This decline in asset demand arises from the sudden decline in
commodity prices (top right panel), which makes commodity producers
poorer. As discussed previously, this collapse in commodity prices arises
from a downward adjustment in sustainable long-run equilibrium invento-
ries (middle left panel). The growth slowdown eliminates the dynamic
inefﬁciency of the economy and thus the need to hold inventories in the
long run. Inventory holders immediately reduce the rate of accumulation of
inventories, which leads to a collapse in the price of commodities. As before,
the decline in commodity prices is reinforced by the short-run increase in
interest rates that makes commodity accumulation less proﬁtable.
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59. The bottom right panel reports the total value of U assets, including the bubble for 
t ≤ 0, both in the case with and in the case without a growth slowdown. It also reports the
value of the “good” U asset in the case with a growth slowdown.














15 18 21 24 27
–4.0
0


















































Figure 15. Dynamics of the Subprime Crisis Response in the Short and the Long Run 
with a Growth Slowdown
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previous discussion indicated that external imbalances could increase 
or decrease when growth slows down, we find that for these parameter
values, the decline in commodity prices accelerates the process of global
rebalancing (middle right panel), largely through an improvement in the
commodity component of the trade balance (bottom left panel).
The growth slowdown generates a pattern of positive co-movements for
asset prices and commodities that closely matches what the world economy
has experienced since July 2008. In our framework the decline in global
economic growth shrinks or even eliminates the bubble by reducing global
asset demand. However, it is important to recall that this experiment
assumes that the growth slowdown is permanent, a highly unlikely situa-
tion. Once real economic conditions recover, our model predicts that asset
demand will rebound, re-creating the chronic shortage of assets, and the
cycle will start again.
Inventories, Oil Prices, and Asset Supply: Some Evidence
We now examine in more detail the role of inventories and the empirical
evidence on the linkage between ﬁnancial factors and commodity prices.
Inventories
One objection to stories like ours, where asset demand for oil plays an
important role in price determination, is that measured oil inventories did
not rise during the recent price spike. Petroleum inventories in the OECD
countries increased from 3.74 billion barrels in January 2000 to 4.08 billion
barrels in April 2008. However, this increase mostly occurred between
2000 and 2006. After the onset of the subprime crisis, OECD petroleum
inventories declined from 4.25 billion barrels in September 2006 to 
4.08 billion barrels across the board.
60
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60. In the United States, petroleum and crude oil stocks increased between January 2000
and September 2006 by 307 million and 168 million barrels, respectively. Between September
2006 and April 2008, U.S. petroleum stocks declined from 1.79 billion to 1.67 billion barrels,
while crude oil inventories remained relatively constant at around 1 billion barrels. A closer
look, however, reveals that nonstrategic crude oil inventories decreased by 13.6 million
barrels. The only component of U.S. petroleum stocks that increased between September
2006 and April 2008 is the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR; see Energy Information
Administration, Monthly Energy Review, tables 3.4 and 11.3). This change in the SPR is a
consequence of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which mandated a gradual increase in the
reserve from 700 million to 1 billion barrels. In May 2008, in response to the rapid increase
in oil prices, Congress voted to stop depositing oil in the SPR.
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inventories need not be a serious concern. First, observed inventories are
the result of two opposing forces: the asset market force, which leads to
an increase in inventories, and a demand force, which does the opposite.
In appendix B we show that if the long-run elasticity of substitution
exceeds 1, inventories follow a nonmonotonic path—rising first and
afterward declining—in response to speculation.
Second, as argued by Jeffrey Frankel and others,
61 producers are the
most efﬁcient inventory holders, since they do not need to extract the oil in
order to hold it. In our model this amounts to assuming d
oilproducer < d, which
implies that all inventories are held under ground.
Our model is amenable to several interpretations where inventories are
just oil in the ground. Suppose, for example, that new reserves of the Z
good are discovered every period. More precisely, the stock of discovered
reserves increases by Z per unit of time. The economy cannot consume
resources that have not been discovered yet. In addition, suppose that the
rights to these new reserves are not capitalized, either because they accrue to
new entrants, or because they are likely to be expropriated, or because they
embody unmodeled uncertainty. This economy would be exactly equivalent
to our simulated economy. Under this interpretation there are no physical
inventories of Z goods. Inventories reﬂect only discovered and not-yet-
consumed reserves of the Z good.
Another, more abstract interpretation is that of a social contract in
region M. This (implicit) contract speciﬁes that each generation is entitled
to an endowment Z of Z goods. They can decide when to sell it. If they do
not sell it immediately, they can store it. Moreover, they can trade rights to
future consumption claims on their endowment; that is, they can sell the Z
good forward. They can also acquire the Z good from agents of the same or
a different generation in M: they can then treat these newly acquired goods
exactly as their own endowment. This economy is once again completely
isomorphic to our economy. Inventories are just goods in the ground. As we
show in appendix A, the underground inventory holding view has important
implications for the effectiveness of recent proposals to tax speculative
transactions in commodities.
The Empirical Link between Oil Prices and Asset Supply
The asset role of oil suggests a negative correlation between oil prices
and the value of assets negatively affected by ﬁnancial shocks, and a posi-
46 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
61. Frankel (2006).
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point for investigating this question, we run the following simple regres-
sion using ordinary least squares (OLS):
where all variables are in logarithms, pt denotes the spot price of crude oil,
S+Pt is the S&P500 index, and yt is the monthly U.S. industrial production
index. In the model a decline in the value of bubble assets that lowers stock
prices leads to a reallocation of assets toward commodities, and so we
expect to ﬁnd β < 0. A decline in growth should also push down commod-
ity prices, and so we expect γ > 0. Table 9 reports the results of this simple
regression for the period from January 1984 to November 2008. We ﬁnd a
negative but statistically insigniﬁcant link between oil prices and stock
market performance, and a positive and mostly insigniﬁcant link between
growth and oil prices.
There are two obvious issues with the OLS regression. First, as shown
in figure 8, the apparent correlation is strongly negative only in the first
phase of the crisis. In the second phase, as explained above, the collapse in
global growth reduces both asset and commodity prices. Second, there is
an obvious reverse causality concern. For instance, an exogenous increase
in oil prices could increase the chances of a recession, leading to a decline
in stock returns, or push up inflation rates, leading to a tightening of
monetary policy, which would also send equities tumbling. To control
for this we use two instruments: the price of gold and the performance
of ﬁnancial stocks relative to the broader market. Increases in the price of
gold are often associated with ﬂight-to-quality episodes. In fact, since
gold itself provides little services or yield, it is the perfect example of an
asset held for speculative reasons. The relative performance of financials
captures the fact that financial crises impact the financial sector more
directly, whereas there is no reason for oil shocks to affect this service
sector more than, for example, the energy-intensive transportation or man-
ufacturing sectors.
The top panel of table 10 presents our instrumental variables estimates.
Notice that the coefﬁcient on equities is much larger than in the OLS esti-
mate and strongly signiﬁcant at the daily, weekly, monthly, and quarterly
frequencies. The elasticity is always in excess of one. The coefﬁcient on
growth has the correct sign at the quarterly and annual frequencies but
appears to be insigniﬁcant. The bottom panel reports the ﬁrst stage of the
instrumental variables regression.
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11472-01_Caballero_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  12:16 PM  Page 48Financial relative performance has the right impact on equilibrium asset
values at all frequencies but annual: conditional on growth, bad news in
U.S. ﬁnancial markets is good news for oil as an asset. Conversely, good
news in U.S. ﬁnancial markets is bad news for oil.
62
Discussion
The prevailing view of ﬁnancial disruptions is one of central bank excesses
and mistakes leading to excess liquidity, speculative bubbles, and unavoid-
able crises. This seems overstated: central banks, when reasonable, are not
nearly that powerful. In this paper we take a contrarian view and provide
an entirely private sector account of the main facts, without any role for
monetary factors. Reality is probably in between.
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62. The results are similar if we restrict the sample to the period before July 2008, pre-
ceding the second phase of the crisis.
Table 10. Instrumental Variables Regressions of Oil Prices on U.S. Stock Prices and
Industrial Productiona
Regression
Independent variable 10-1 10-2 10-3 10-4 10-5
Second-stage regressions
Change in log S&P500 index −1.14 −1.52 −2.96 −3.08 −3.74
(4.95) (3.45) (3.12) (3.71) (1.98)
Change in industrial  −0.94 3.86 7.99
production index (0.40) (1.25) (1.39)
First-stage regressions
Log change in S&P500  0.29 0.28 0.29 0.29 −0.01
ﬁnancials index less change  (8.55) (5.56) (2.96) (2.75) (0.06)
in overall S&P500
Log change in price of gold −0.11 −0.08 −0.09 −0.11 −0.28
(3.87) (1.91) (0.94) (1.21) (1.83)
Data frequency Daily Weekly Monthly Quarterly Annual
No. of observations 6,098 1,296 297 295 286
R
2 0.06 0.06 0.06 NA NA
Source: Authors’ regressions.
a. The dependent variable in the second-stage regressions is the change in the logarithm of the spot
price in dollars of a barrel of West Texas Intermediate oil. The dependent variable in the ﬁrst-stage
regressions is the change in the logarithm of the S&P500 index. Changes at all intervals are measured
from the end of one period to the end of the next. Quarterly and annual regressions are run on overlap-
ping monthly data. Eicker-White robust t statistics are reported in parentheses for the daily, weekly, and
monthly regressions and Newey-West t statistics for the quarterly and annual regressions, with windows
of 2 and 11 months, respectively. Constant terms are included in all regressions (results not reported).
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present crisis with chronic excess demand for ﬁnancial assets; the subprime
market developments may have been merely a (failed) market attempt to
bridge this gap. Within this perspective we argue that the sharp rise in oil
prices following the subprime crisis—nearly 100 percent in just a matter of
months, and in the face of recessionary shocks—was the result of a specu-
lative response to the ﬁnancial crisis itself, in an attempt to rebuild asset
supply. That is, the global economy was subjected to one shock with mul-
tiple implications rather than to two separate shocks (ﬁnancial and oil).
Eventually, the persistent financial crisis and its many multipliers
severely hurt growth prospects, and recognition of this fact triggered an
implosion in commodity prices and asset demand more broadly. However,
by the same token, when real conditions recover, our model predicts that
asset demand is likely to rebound, re-creating the chronic shortage of assets,
and the cycle will start again. Regulation, unless distortionary enough to
depress growth, is no match for these market forces. The real problem is
more macroeconomic in nature and unlikely to go away until the world
economy’s ability to generate sound stores of value catches up with its
potential income growth. In other words, like so much else these days, the
outcome depends largely on developments within China and other emerg-
ing markets.
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APPENDIX A
Speculation and Policy
In this appendix we expand on the paper’s penultimate section and analyze
the effect of introducing futures markets, as well as the effects of policies
aimed at curtailing “speculation.”
Futures
Let us start by introducing (fully collateralized) futures contracts on
the Z good. We make two simple and related points: ﬁrst, the payoff of the
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by simple futures positions; second, in our model the introduction of a
futures market has no impact on the equilibrium.
By covered interest parity, the forward rate ft+s is equal to
Consider the strategy of buying a forward contract at t with maturity t + s
and reselling it at date t + s′ < t + s. The payoff at t + s′ is
which, in net present value, is exactly the same as that from buying one
unit of the Z good at t, storing it until t + s′, and then selling it on the spot
market. To the extent that there is heterogeneity in the cost of storing the
Z good, all the inventories will be held by the agents with the lowest storage
costs—typically the producers, who can leave at least some of the Z good
in the ground. Agents with higher storage costs will prefer to buy futures
contracts from the producers.
Equilibrium and Policy
However, the introduction of futures contracts has absolutely no effect
on the equilibrium of our economy. Futures do not increase asset supply:
every long position is offset by a corresponding short position, and there
are no agents with biased beliefs deviating from the perfect-foresight price
path. As a result, the imposition of a tax on futures trading, or the prohibi-
tion of such trading, would have absolutely no moderating effect on com-
modity prices.
In order for a tax to have any consequence in our model, it must affect
the agents with the lowest storage costs, that is, those who actually hold the
inventories. Thus, let us consider the effect of taxing producers for holding
inventories. Although in practice this is extremely hard to do, since pro-
ducers are likely to hold most of their inventories under ground, it is a
useful positive exercise to gauge the potential impact of this type of policy.
It turns out that taxes on the value of inventory holdings are almost iso-
morphic with the holding cost parameter d, except that under the tax inter-
pretation, the proceeds can be rebated as a lump sum to the agents at no
resource cost. We take the latter route here and let τ denote the tax rate per
unit of value of inventories (that is, the tax per unit of inventory is τpt).
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inefficiency assumption (assumption 1 in the text) to the following:
Assumption 3:
Under assumption 3, the bubbleless steady state of the economy is now
such that the interest rate is given by
the price grows at rate g:
and long-run inventories are constant:
The long-run level inventory function I(τ) is decreasing with respect to τ,
whereas the price of oil is unaffected, since the relative consumption of X
and Z goods is unchanged in the long run. However, in the short run the
imposition of a tax τ lowers inventories and the price of oil, which is equal
to pt =αXt/(Z − I
.
t).
In summary, a tax on inventories reduces inventories and succeeds in
temporarily depressing the price of the Z good but does not affect it in the
long run. Note also that the tax reduces the equilibrium interest rate and
aggravates dynamic inefficiency in the bubbleless equilibrium, at a cost
to the economy. The intuition is transparent. A dynamically inefficient
economy is characterized by a scarcity of assets. A tax on inventories dis-
courages the accumulation of inventories and hence reduces asset supply.




In this appendix we expand on a remark in the paper’s penultimate section
and analyze formally the consequences for inventory accumulation of
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63. Note that the bubbly equilibrium of the economy is not affected by τ. Moreover, if
assumption 3 is violated, then the bubbleless equilibrium becomes identical to that of the
benchmark no-inventory economy.
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inventory dynamics, the forward curve for commodity prices plays a central
role. In our model, after the shock, the world is deterministic and risk-neutral.
At date t the forward price s periods ahead, ft+s, is simply the future spot
price pt+s. In our case it will prove more convenient to reason in terms of the
log-forward curve, which traces log ft+s = log pt+s as a function of maturity s.
The decision to accumulate inventories is determined by comparing the 
slope of the log-forward curve  of the price for the Z good with the 
interest rate rt. The steeper that slope, the higher the expected increase in
price of the Z good, and the more attractive storage becomes. Similarly, the
lower the interest rate, the more attractive storage becomes. The elasticity
σ of the demand for the Z good is a key parameter governing the slope of
the log-forward curve. The higher σ, the ﬂatter the log-forward curve.
Key to our analysis is the basic idea that the short-run elasticity of
demand for commodities σ is low in the short run but high in the long run.




short < 1 < σ
long. The switch from σ
short to σ
long is typically
gradual and potentially governed by a number of time- and state-dependent
factors. If σ
long for the Z good is high enough, then inventories will eventu-
ally be undone. This is formalized by the following assumption:
Assumption 4:
This assumption is more likely to be veriﬁed, the higher is σ
long. When it is
veriﬁed, the long-run steady state of the economy features no inventories.
In the long-run steady state, the interest rate is δθ. The price of the Z good 
is given by  and rises at a rate g/σ
long, which is too low to 
make the accumulation of inventories worthwhile. The share of the Z good
in total consumption converges to zero, and the economy effectively
behaves as an economy without commodities.
Turning to transitional dynamics, imagine that the economy enters the
region where σ=σ
long > 1 with positive inventories It > 0. The presence of
inventories affects both the goods market and the asset market: the total
intertemporal supply of the Z good is higher, which depresses the price pt of
the Z good. Asset supply is higher, since inventories act as a store of value,
resulting in a higher interest rate rt. These two forces trigger a process 
of inventory reduction, and the economy eventually converges to a steady
state with no inventories.
1
σ α
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COMMENT BY
KATHRYN M. DOMINGUEZ This ambitious paper by Ricardo
Caballero, Emmanuel Farhi, and Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas seeks to
explain, in one model, all that is wrong in the global economy. The cul-
prit is underdeveloped financial markets in emerging Asia and the oil-
producing countries. U.S. ﬁscal and monetary policies play no role. The
three stylized phenomena explained and linked in the model are the large
U.S. current account deﬁcits (and the counterbalancing large surpluses in
emerging Asia and oil-producing countries), ﬁnancial bubbles, and volatile
commodity prices. The model intriguingly suggests that all three features
can persist in equilibrium.
The model begins by dividing the world into two regions, one with
developed ﬁnancial markets, which the authors label U (for the United
States), and one with underdeveloped financial markets, labeled M. The 
M countries extract and consume commodities Z, while U only consumes
Z. The model starts with the formation and bursting of a ﬁnancial bubble in
U (although where the bubble starts turns out to be unimportant). With the
bursting of the bubble, global savers ﬂee the bubble assets in search of new
stores of value in U. Note that savers ﬂee to safer assets in U and not to the
M countries, because ﬁnancial markets are more developed in U. These
capital ﬂows (from M to U) lead to a decline in real interest rates in U. Low
real interest rates, in turn, lead to speculative commodity hoarding and
commodity price jumps, resulting in wealth transfers from U to M. M’s
new wealth, however, again ﬁnds its way to U, which has comparative
advantage in quality asset creation. These capital inﬂows further lower real
interest rates in U and allow U to run ever larger current account deﬁcits.
Changes in interest rates are the driving force in this model. The burst-
ing of the initial financial bubble and the consequent scramble by global
56
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savers to place their wealth in higher-quality assets in U lead to lower
real interest rates. It is these low interest rates that make commodity
inventory accumulation profitable, driving up commodity prices and
leading in turn to wealth transfers from U (the consumers of commodi-
ties) to M (the commodity producers). The link between low real interest
rates and high commodity prices comes from Harold Hotelling’s insight
that for resources in fixed supply with zero extraction costs, extraction in
equilibrium is characterized by resource prices that increase at the inter-
est rate.
1 If a resource is in fixed supply and its future price is expected to
be high, then low interest rates drive up current prices in order to induce
owners to sell.
In the authors’ model the resource, Z, is not assumed to be in ﬁxed sup-
ply, but instead there is a flow extraction constraint that is insufficient
to meet demand growth and acts to limit supply. The tricky aspect of this
assumption is that expectation formation in this sort of model is less
straightforward than in the standard Hotelling ﬁxed-supply setup. The link
between the interest rate and the commodity price posited by Hotelling
will be broken if expectations of future commodity prices systematically
change with the same forces that affect interest rates. The paper suggests
that the rise in commodity prices in early 2008 and the more recent precip-
itous decline in oil prices (and many other commodity prices) ﬁt well with
their model, in that when demand for these commodities was high, the ﬂow
extraction constraint was binding, and when demand growth declined, so
did commodity prices as the ﬂow constraint ceased to bind. What is more
difﬁcult to connect in this version of Hotelling’s model is the role of inter-
est rates. At the same time that global demand growth declined, counter-
cyclical policies in the United States were targeted at reducing real interest
rates, so that interest rates remained low, while commodity prices ﬁrst
spiked and then fell. In the ﬁrst seven months of 2008, commodities posted
their best performance in 35 years, rising by 35 percent; then, in August,
they had their worst month in 28 years, falling by 11 percent, followed by
an even more precipitous decline of 41 percent in the four months through
November. These extreme movements suggest that expectations, rather
than interest rates, have played a dominant role.
The version of this paper presented at the September 2008 Brookings
Panel conference was written before commodity prices collapsed, so this
1. Harold Hotelling, “The Economics of Exhaustible Resources,” Journal of Political
Economy 39, no. 2 (1931): 137–75.
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aspect of the story (which the paper terms the “second phase” of the crisis)
is new. Whereas in the earlier version the bursting of the ﬁnancial bubble
did not lead to a fall in global growth, but only a slowdown in U, in the
new version it is this global slowdown that removes the excess demand in
asset markets, leading to a decumulation of commodity inventories and a
fall in commodity prices. Interestingly, in the earlier version commodity
prices were predicted to fall only if the U.S. ﬁnancial crisis subsided. In
this version it is the ongoing crisis and its effects on global economic
growth that lead to a collapse in commodity prices and asset prices more
generally.
Wealth transfers play another key role in this paper. Savers always
prefer to invest in U, where ﬁnancial markets are more developed. Conse-
quently, even when the M countries are doing well (that is, when com-
modity prices are high), capital flows to U. The focus in the paper is
exclusively on the private sector, so that, strictly speaking, these wealth
transfers do not include government flows. Data from the International
Monetary Fund’s Balance of Payments Statistics, however, suggest that
foreign governments and ofﬁcial institutions have dramatically increased
their role in U.S. capital inflows in recent years through their foreign
reserve accumulations. Interestingly, in a recent paper I report evidence
that it is precisely those countries with less developed ﬁnancial markets
that hold high levels of foreign reserves, the bulk of which are invested
in U.S. assets.
2 This suggests that including the government sector in the
model might well strengthen the results (more on this to come).
Is there evidence that U has comparative advantage over M in creating
high-quality ﬁnancial assets, as the authors’ model assumes? One testable
hypothesis that follows from this assumption is that countries with higher-
quality financial markets pay lower premiums on their assets. Joseph
Gruber and Steven Kamin examine this hypothesis and ﬁnd that real long-
term interest rates and expected earnings yields on bonds and equities are
no lower in the United States than in other industrial countries.
3 Their
paper does not examine asset premiums in M countries, which are surely
2. Kathryn M. Dominguez, “International Reserves and Underdeveloped Capital Mar-
kets,” University of Michigan (September 2008).
3. Joseph Gruber and Steven Kamin, “Do Differences in Financial Development
Explain the Global Pattern of Current Account Imbalances?” International Finance Discus-
sion Papers 2008-923 (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
March 2008).
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there is little reason for capital to ﬂow to the United States in preference
over other industrial countries.
Along with providing an intriguing model that connects the present
ﬁnancial crisis with commodity price movements and global imbalances,
this paper also presents some suggestive empirical work, consisting of
back-of-the-envelope impact estimates as well as a calibration exercise to
work through the implications of the model dynamics. The paper marshals
an impressive array of estimates from the literature, starting with the size
of the perceived losses generated by the ﬁnancial crisis, to explore what
the model can explain (and what it misses). The results of these exercises
suggest that although the model does a fairly good job of explaining the
first phase of the crisis (through the summer of 2008), harder work is
needed to connect the crisis with the global slowdown, the consequent dra-
matic reversal in commodity prices, and the implications of both for global
imbalances. To be fair, few economists predicted the downward spiral of
events of the past year, with or without the aid of a model, and the authors
of this paper do not claim to be clairvoyant.
In its conclusion the paper notes that by taking a “contrarian view” and
assuming no role for government policy, it is likely to overstate the role of
the private sector in the current global crisis. It seems incumbent on the
discussant, therefore, to describe some alternative explanations that the
model ignores.
One of the stylized facts that the model attempts to explain is the sus-
tained U.S. current account deﬁcit. A country’s current account balance is
equivalent to the difference between its domestic saving and its invest-
ment. Private saving and public saving in the United States have been
unusually low in recent years, relative to other industrial countries and rel-
ative to U.S. history. Since 2000 the U.S. personal saving rate has aver-
aged 2 percent of personal disposable income (in the 1980s it was 
9 percent, and in the 1990s it was 5 percent; currently it is close to zero),
and U.S. net national saving, at negative 2 percent of GDP, is at its lowest
rate since the Great Depression. One explanation for the low private saving
rate, at least through 2007, was that rapid increases in the stock market and
in residential property led to a wealth effect. In the paper this wealth effect
is driven by capital inﬂows from M countries, due to the scarcity of quality
ﬁnancial assets outside of U. The model, however, does not include a ratio-
nale (or a role) for low public saving. Historically, when private saving
has been low, public saving has tended to provide an offsetting force.
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although it begs the question of whether ﬁscal policy can in the future
provide a stabilizing role.
There is no money in the model, and therefore no banks and no role for
central bank monetary or exchange rate policy. Although recently banks
seem not to be playing their usual role as intermediaries, their absence in a
model of ﬁnancial crises is jarring. Likewise, although the role of expan-
sionary monetary policy during the Greenspan era may be overplayed, it
seems likely that the low real interest rates that are at the heart of the
paper’s commodity price story are driven at least in part by U.S. central
bank policy decisions. Further, the desire on the part of many M countries
to keep their currencies stable against the dollar can provide an additional
rationale for why capital has continued to ﬂow from M to U even as asset
prices in U have deteriorated.
The paper purposely ignores the role of money and government policy
in order to highlight the role of differences in ﬁnancial market develop-
ment. The argument is that the lack of ﬁnancial development in M coun-
tries, in and of itself, can lead to global ﬁnancial market dislocation. The
key implication is that as long as ﬁnancial development lags in M, the cur-
rent patterns of global imbalances will persist. One reason to be a bit sus-
picious of this dire prediction is that this asymmetry in ﬁnancial market
development existed long before global imbalances ballooned after 1998.
If one measures ﬁnancial development according to the relative size of
bond and equity markets, the gap between industrial countries and devel-
oping countries is apparent starting in the late 1980s, yet the U.S. current
account ran small deﬁcits in those years—and even a small surplus in
1991. Of course, if the current ﬁnancial crisis continues for much longer,
ﬁnancial markets in U may well shrink to such an extent that ﬁnancial mar-
kets in M will ﬁnally catch up.
This paper attempts to provide a “one model ﬁts all” explanation of
recent global economic events. This is a tall order. Policymakers are
likely to have mixed views on the paper’s message. On the one hand, by
focusing on ﬁnancial market development rather than policy mistakes, the
paper may seem to give monetary and ﬁscal authorities an opportunity to
dodge responsibility for the current mess. On the other hand, the impo-
tence of policy in the model is unlikely to make it popular in current pol-
icy circles. The contribution of the paper, therefore, is less in its lessons
for policy and more in the insights it provides regarding the critical role of
private sector capital ﬂows in a world of differentially imperfect ﬁnancial
markets.
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COMMENT BY
CARMEN M. REINHART I appreciate the opportunity to discuss this
paper by Ricardo Caballero, Emmanuel Farhi, and Pierre-Olivier Gourin-
chas. This paper was described to me as a mix of theoretical and empirical
work that attempts a hat trick: explaining the joint combination of global
imbalances, the deﬂation of the housing price bubble that created the sub-
prime crisis, and volatile oil prices. Given the scope of this undertaking, it
is not really surprising that the authors deliver only on the theoretical
part—the empirical analysis takes up only about 5 of the paper’s 55 pages.
Because this is a paper mainly about theory, I will devote my comments
mostly to the framework the authors present, with particular emphasis on
the basic assumptions made.
The paper rests on two building blocks familiar from the authors’ earlier
work. First, emerging market economies are increasing their demand for
sound and liquid ﬁnancial assets over time. Essentially, the residents of
those countries want a safe store for their newfound wealth. This demand
is treated by the authors entirely as a private sector phenomenon, but gov-
ernments play a role because safe, liquid assets are in scarce supply.
Indeed, one government alone, that of the United States, creates the Trea-
sury instruments that are especially prized in investors’ portfolios.
1 Sec-
ond, ﬂuctuations in commodity prices (or oil prices—the authors refer to
both interchangeably) are explained to an important extent by speculative
hoarding.
The model that the authors build to explain these features can be
described succinctly. There are two regions. One, the United States, is
endowed with “trees.” The other, the emerging market economies, has a
ﬁxed endowment of an unspeciﬁed commodity. Only these two goods
exist, and people in both regions consume both. Little trees grow at a posi-
tive rate. Commodity supplies do not grow at all. The last two assump-
tions imply a secular increase in the stock of trees relative to that of the
commodity, so that the price of the latter rises over time.
The inconvenient fact, however, is that the actual run-up in world com-
modity prices relative to the prices of other goods is a very recent phenom-
1. An inﬂuential paper by Gourinchas and Hélène Rey, “From World Banker to World
Venture Capitalist: US External Adjustment and the Exorbitant Privilege,” Working Paper
11563 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005), examines the
consequences of this “exorbitant privilege” (a phrase that, the authors note, originated not
with Charles de Gaulle, as is commonly held, but with his then-ﬁnance minister Valéry Gis-
card d’Estaing) whereby the United States alone is able to issue what are viewed as the
safest of assets.
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enon (which in recent months has abruptly unraveled). In fact, since about
the turn of the eighteenth century, real commodity prices have been on 
a secular decline, as shown in my ﬁgure 1, taken from a recent paper I 
co-wrote with Kenneth Rogoff.
2 Thus, the model is broadly at odds with
the big picture that emerges from this roughly two-and-a-quarter-century
history. However, since this implication of the model ﬁts well with the
cyclical pattern of commodity prices between about 2000 and 2007 (the
period the authors are most interested in explaining), I will focus my
remarks on some of the core model’s other simplifying assumptions that I
ﬁnd more problematic.
THE MODEL LACKS A FINANCIAL SECTOR. The paper purports to examine 
a ﬁnancial crash, and the word “ﬁnancial” is used liberally throughout.
Dictionary.com deﬁnes “ﬁnancial” as “1. pertaining to monetary receipts
and expenditures; pertaining or relating to money matters; pecuniary:
ﬁnancial operations; 2. of or pertaining to those commonly engaged in
dealing with money and credit.” Thus, the authors’ use of the word is difﬁ-
cult to reconcile with the fact that their model is a real model, with neither
money, nor credit, nor ﬁnancial intermediaries, nor exchange rates—in
short, without a ﬁnancial sector.
THE MODEL LACKS AN OFFICIAL SECTOR. Further, lacking a ﬁnancial sector,
the model has no scope for the stockpiling of international reserves by the
Figure 1. Real Commodity Prices, 1790–2007
Source: Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly 
(Princeton University Press, forthcoming), drawing on various sources. 
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2. Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of
Financial Folly (Princeton University Press, forthcoming).
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central banks of emerging market economies. Yet given that the worst
financial crises of the late 1990s originated in emerging markets (fol-
lowed in the next decade by crises in Argentina and Uruguay), it is worth
noting that the key driver of the demand for U.S. Treasury securities from
emerging markets has been the ofﬁcial sector (central banks trying to build
a war chest), not the private sector as stressed in the model. Private
demand for U.S. assets in the run-up to the 2007 crisis came primarily
from other developed economies. The clear manifestation of the United
States’ “exorbitant privilege” can be seen in the fact that foreign ofﬁcial
acquisitions of U.S. government securities have accounted for an increas-
ing share of total issuance (ﬁgure 2).
This massive accumulation of foreign exchange reserves would seem
central to understanding recent developments regarding the global imbal-
ances between the developed economies and emerging markets—notably
in Asia, as Vincent Reinhart and I have discussed elsewhere.
3 This role for
the ofﬁcial sector is something that the authors may want to incorporate in
3. Carmen M. Reinhart and Vincent Reinhart, “Is the US Too Big to Fail?” (VoxEU,
2008). www.voxeu.com/index.php?q=node/2568.
Figure 2. Foreign Purchases of U.S. Government Securities, 1948–2008a
Source: Carmen M. Reinhart and Vincent Reinhart, “Is the US Too Big to Fail?” (VoxEU, 2008). 
www.voxeu.com/index.php?q=node/2568. 
a. As reported in the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds Accounts. 
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a future variant of their framework, as it provides another important argu-
ment for one of their central premises, namely, that “safe assets” are in
short supply in emerging markets.
THE DETERMINANTS OF SAVING ARE OVERSIMPLIFIED. To explain aggregate
saving, the authors have to assume that it results from the birth of new gen-
erations and the return on accumulated savings. There is no role for ﬁnan-
cial liberalization (and the related issue of liquidity constraints) or wealth
effects.
4 Speciﬁcally, the only way the saving rate can decrease in the
model is with an increase in the death rate. How can such a model possibly
explain the roughly 7-percentage-point reduction in the U.S. saving rate
over the past two decades? In light of the model’s emphasis on cross-
border saving differentials and asset demands, revisiting this rather restric-
tive premise is called for.
THERE IS NO UNCERTAINTY IN THE MODEL. Lastly, there is no uncertainty
in the authors’ model, and thus no reason for a risk premium to exist, let
alone to rise during a crisis, and the value of the nonstorable good as col-
lateral should always be known. Hence the key event analyzed in the
model is hard to reconcile with the model. We are told that a subprime
shock “can be interpreted as the realization that ﬁnancial instruments are
less sound than they were previously perceived to be.” In the absence of
ﬁnancial instruments and uncertainty, it is hard to imagine how such a
shock would take place.
In fact, the subprime crisis as depicted in the model is an exogenous
and adverse terms-of-trade shock. The structure of the model precludes
overborrowing, leveraging, or excessive risk taking. Similarly ruled out
are herding behavior by investors and the nonlinearities that produce
self-fulfilling prophecies. Thus, absent in this framework are any of the
mechanisms crucial to this or any other financial crisis. As for the key
mechanism, the U.S. terms of trade, its decline began in 1999, and so it
matches neither the timing nor the magnitude of the current financial
crisis.
I find this an important paper that offers two key insights. The first is
the importance of understanding the scarcity of safe “saving vehicles” in
the emerging (and the not-so-emerging) world, and of the United States
as the provider of such assets. (The stampede into U.S. Treasury securities
4. See Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel and Luis Servén, “Saving across the World: Puzzles and
Policies,” Discussion Paper 354 (Washington: World Bank, 1997), for cross-country evi-
dence on these issues.
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in the fall of 2008 attests to this scarcity.)5 The second is that this scarcity
is related to the commodity price dynamics of recent years. This is not,
however, a framework that lends itself to explaining or understanding
ﬁnancial crashes in general. In particular, it does not add to our under-
standing of traditional banking crises or the problems that produced the
current subprime crisis.
My preferred diagnosis of the subprime ﬁnancial crisis in the United
States is spelled out simply in the following quotation: “[Overindebted-
ness] may be started by many causes, of which the most common appears
to be new opportunities to invest at a big prospective proﬁt . . . such as
through new inventions, new industries, development of new resources,
opening of new lands or new markets. Easy money is the great cause of
over-borrowing.” That the essence of the problem can be captured so sim-
ply is encouraging. What is discouraging is that this insight was made by
Irving Fisher in 1933.
6 Crises recur, but the best explanations are eternal.
GENERAL DISCUSSION Lawrence Summers noted that the idea is
already widely accepted that high rates of saving in emerging markets have
pushed real interest rates down in the rest of the world, leading to the large
U.S. current account deﬁcit and a series of market bubbles. What is of
interest in the paper is its development of a coherent, consistent, and well-
designed intertemporal general equilibrium model that articulates this
idea. Of even greater interest is determining whether this model is the
appropriate way to think about the performance of the U.S. and world
economies over the past ﬁve years. The central argument in the paper is
not new; it goes back to Harold Hotelling, was used by Summers him-
self and Robert Barsky in the 1980s to explain the behavior of gold and
other commodities, and was recently used by Jeffrey Frankel in analyzing
the commodities boom. The paper would be more convincing, Summers
5. See Reinhart and Reinhart, “Is the US Too Big to Fail?” on this episode: “If this had
happened to any other government in the world whose national ﬁnancial institutions were in
as deep disarray as those of the US, investors would have run for the hills—cutting off the
offending nation from global capital markets. But for the US, just the opposite has hap-
pened. Rather than facing prohibitive costs of raising funds, US Treasury Bills have seen
yields fall in absolute terms and markedly in relative terms to the yields on private instru-
ments. This has been called a ‘ﬂight to safety.’ But why do global investors rush into a burn-
ing building at the ﬁrst sign of smoke?”
6. Irving Fisher, “The Debt-Deﬂation Theory of Great Depressions,” Econometrica 1,
no. 4 (1933): 348 (italics in original).
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markets. He suggested that rather than simply demonstrating the consis-
tency of their explanation with the observed facts, the authors should place
more emphasis on proving that the factors they identify are indeed the cen-
tral ones in accounting for this complex phenomenon.
Bradford DeLong contended that it was reserve accumulation by central
banks that had pushed real interest rates down from a dynamically efﬁcient
to a dynamically inefﬁcient level. He admired the authors’ model for its
simplicity but thought it would be of even greater value if it incorporated
more factors into a ﬁve- or six-dimensional system rather than the present
two-dimensional system of equations. He felt that the recent behavior of
foreign central banks ﬁt with the authors’ model but that the recent actions
of the Federal Reserve and the Treasury with respect to the ﬁnancial crisis
did not. A larger, more elaborate model might do a better job.
Robert Hall suggested that the United States was experiencing not a
major ﬁnancial crisis but rather the popping of a huge housing bubble. He,
too, praised the authors’ model for the simplicity with which it modeled
the bubble. He noted that monetary policy cannot deal with asset price
bubbles directly but rather must provide a nominal anchor, such as an
interest rate. He also wished the model were more comprehensive, in order
to better address the level of U.S. saving relative to the world economy,
even in situations without asset price bubbles.
Richard Cooper remarked that the authors’ model is primarily about pri-
vate behavior and assumes that the private sector faces a shortage of ﬁnan-
cial assets. He objected to that idea, noting that there is plenty of money, a
ﬁnancial asset, available, although he conceded that assets offering high
yields may be in short supply. He suggested revising the model’s assump-
tions so as to deemphasize the shortage of assets and instead focus on the
excess saving that has led to low real interest rates. He suggested further
that the model include the rest of the developed world, as well as the demo-
graphic factors that have contributed to a decline in investment, focusing
primarily on the private sector, which accounts for the large majority of
foreign investment in the United States.
Kristin Forbes complimented the authors on the richness of their model
but questioned its ﬁdelity to certain accepted stylized facts. In the model,
oil supplies are somewhat elastic with respect to interest rates, but in the
real world, oil supplies are not responsive to movements in interest rates
since exploration and drilling take time and old wells become less produc-
tive over time. She proposed an alternative model that could explain the
stylized facts in a manner consistent with the short-term inelasticity of oil
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have a limited supply of ﬁnancial assets and want to invest in the United
States, and that foreigners withdraw their money when a ﬁnancial crisis
occurs in the United States. In her model, the dollar would depreciate as a
result of the withdrawal, and since oil is priced in dollars, demand for oil in
foreign countries would increase, and oil prices would rise substantially.
She believed her model would better explain the pattern in oil prices seen
in the weeks before the conference, when a decline in oil prices followed
an appreciation of the dollar.
Frederic Mishkin recommended that the authors consider the ﬁnancial
crisis in its historical context, particularly with respect to ﬁnancial innova-
tion. In the long run such innovation produces better and more efﬁcient
financial systems, but in the short run it can cause major problems. He
believed that the massive interventions of the Federal Reserve and the
Treasury had mitigated the current crisis and prevented it from becoming
another Great Depression or worse.
Michael Woodford was intrigued by the paper’s implication that the
subprime crisis had caused the large increase in oil prices. He recom-
mended that the authors stress the impact on oil, rather than on commodi-
ties in general, since it is unlikely that the mechanism works identically for
all commodities. He wondered about the necessity of using a model based
on the notion of a persistent rational bubble. He believed the model
includes a structural situation where, in the absence of bubbles or invento-
ries, the equilibrium real interest rate is lower than the growth rate, allow-
ing for the possibility of a rational bubble that could last forever. Yet it is
not necessary to invoke rational bubbles in order to explain the current
ﬁnancial crisis; the bubble could be an irrational one yet still have the same
effects as the story told in the model.
Hélène Rey commented on the model’s interesting implication regard-
ing the adjustment of the U.S. current account deﬁcit: in the model, the
bursting of the bubble in the United States moves the current account
toward balance, while at the same time rising commodity prices lead to
massive wealth transfers to commodity-producing economies, which in
turn reinvest part of their gains in the U.S. financial markets, thus slow-
ing the adjustment process. Since the model is essentially a two-country
model, she suggested that the authors discuss the more complex real-world
situation more thoroughly elsewhere in the paper. In the recent past, the
Asian economies were the United States’ main creditors, but as the increase
in commodity prices has transferred wealth to the commodity producers,
the latter have become the major creditors. These economies tend to have
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affect the adjustment process—a consequence not considered in the model’s
benchmark case.
William Nordhaus further addressed the oil dimension. He argued that
the presence of oil-related assets in a hedge fund’s portfolio is evidence
either of incompetence or of a bubble. In the context of the Hotelling
model, the idea presented in the paper that price growth equals a risk-
adjusted interest rate would not hold for a commodity unless there are zero
extraction costs, zero unproduced reserves, and only one grade of the com-
modity. He also pointed out that hedge funds do not actually hold the
underlying asset. Commenting on the increase in oil price volatility over
the past forty years, he ascribed that volatility to two factors: the shift from
a situation of excess supply to one of scarcity and inelastic supply, and the
low short-run price elasticity of demand for crude oil. The only ways to
reduce that volatility are to ﬁnd a more elastic source of production or to
return to a situation of excess capacity.
Christopher Carroll, citing a recent article in The Onion titled 
“Recession-Plagued Nation Demands New Bubble to Invest In,” ques-
tioned the authors’ choice of a limited time frame. The recent period has
been characterized by a series of bubbles: the tech bubble, the linked
housing and subprime bubbles, and the oil bubble. He wondered whether
the authors thought the economy would ever make the transition from the
present state of affairs, where low interest rates translate into bubbles, to
one where they translate into higher investment in real productive capital.
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